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Abstract 
  Cost overruns in weapon system purchases have plagued the Department of Defense 
(DoD) throughout its history and have resulted in schedule delays and potentially reduced 
combat capability.  This thesis created an empirical model that begins to explain those cost 
overruns.  The model describes how changes in defense budgets, consolidation of the 
defense industry, acquisition reform, war, and cost estimating error are related to cost 
overruns.   
 The cost performance of 186 major weapon system programs managed by the Air 
Force, Army, and Navy from 1970 to 2002 was described using a panel regression model.  
This research found that funding instability resulting from changing levels of defense 
budgets accounted for an increase of over $13.3 billion in weapon system costs since 
1970.  This research also found that the defense industry consolidation of the 1990’s did 
not result in significant savings to the DoD.  Finally, this research found that contrary to 
past studies, several acquisition reforms are correlated with a decrease in weapon system 
cost overruns.  In particular, reforms resulting from the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982, the 
Packard Commission Recommendations of 1986 and the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 resulted in savings of almost $124 billion since 1982. 
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THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC FACTORS AND ACQUISITION REFORMS ON THE 
COST OF DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The problem of cost growth in weapon system development…has been a reoccurring theme in acquisition 
reform for the last several decades.   Despite its high visibility, there has been little systematic and 
consistent analysis of cost growth patterns and trends and factors that effect cost growth. 
-Jarvaise et al., 1996:iii 
 
General Issue 
According to a 1993 RAND study, the average cost growth of a Department of 
Defense (DoD) Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) program was 20 percent (Drezner et al., 
1993:xiii).  More recent research, such as an October 2000 study by the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU), has identified cost growth in research and development 
programs as high as 40 percent (Swank et al, 2000:iii).   Figure 1 depicts the percentage of 
cost overruns per year on major Air Force, Army, and Navy programs from 1970 to 2002. 
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Figure 1. Cost Overruns All Services (1970-2002) 
(DAES Database, Author’s Calculations:2006) 
  
 To understand the magnitude of this problem, consider that in 2004 the Air Force 
alone had an annual budget of over $127 billion, enough that if it were a company it would 
be the eleventh largest in the world.  Similarly, with a 2004 budget of over $441 billion, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) would be by far the largest company in the world according 
to Forbes Magazine’s list of largest companies by total sales (Forbes Magazine, 2004).  
Notice in Table 1 that nearly a third of the DoD budget in 2004 was dedicated to Production 
and Research and Development activities.   
Table 1. 2004 DoD Budget Summary (National Defense Budget Estimates, 2006:67) 
2004 DoD Budget Summary (In billions of FY2004 Dollars) 
Appropriation Obligation Authority Percentage 
Production and R&D $158.0  33% 
Operations and Maintenance 
and Other 
$322.3  67% 
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  Since defense budgets are essentially fixed in a given year, cost overruns create serious 
problems for defense acquisition managers and for policy makers.  They necessitate 
extensions of program schedules, and potentially cause a reduction in weapon system 
quantities and capabilities, as well as funding instability in even those programs that did not 
experience cost overruns but were affected by reprogramming of funds.  This instability in 
funding only further exacerbates cost overruns (McNutt, 1998:307).   
 In response to cost and schedule growth and other problems, Congress, the DoD, and the 
individual military services have instituted a series of changes to the acquisitions process 
that include changes to the law, updates to military regulation, and an overhaul of the DoD 
acquisition training process.  Table 2 is a list of major reforms to the defense acquisition 
process in the last 20 years.: 
Table 2. Major Acquisition Reforms (Modified from Scofield, 2003:19) 
Major Acquisition Reforms Efforts 
Year Effort 
1982 Nunn-McCurdy Act 
1986 Packard Commission 
1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act   
(DAWIA) 
1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
 
Specific Issue 
 Research on DoD cost overruns is abundant and has ranged from descriptive studies, 
like the 1993 and 1996 RAND studies by Jarvaise et al. and Drezner et al., to case studies 
like Singleton’s 1991 Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) thesis and McNutt’s 1998 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology dissertation. Others such as Searle (1997), 
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 Christensen et al. (1999), Holbrook (2003), and Phillips (2004) have investigated the impact 
of acquisition reforms on cost overruns.   
 The whole of this research has identified several factors that may be correlated with cost 
overruns yet in large part, past research has not been able to empirically quantify or model 
their relative impact.  Table 3 is a list of some of the factors identified by past research as 
being related to cost overruns and the direction of impact suggested by the past research. 
Table 3. Factors Impacting Cost Overruns 
Factors Expected Direction of Impact 
Acquisition Reforms Inconclusive 
Funding Instability + 
Estimation Error + 
Defense Industry Consolidation - 
War + 
 
 While past research on cost overruns has been split with some researchers 
investigating its causes and others studying the impact of acquisition reform, this research 
will illustrate that those two areas of research are really one and that an aggregate model 
of cost overruns that accounts for these factors in a single model is needed.   
Research Objectives 
 The motivation for this research is the lack of empirical models that explain the 
causes of cost overruns in defense weapon system purchases.  The purpose of this 
research is to create a model of defense weapon system cost growth that can be used to 
answer the following questions: 
4 
 1. Did the defense industry consolidation and concurrent decrease in defense 
budgets that occurred in the 1990’s affect the cost of defense weapon 
systems? 
2. Is war correlated with an increase in weapon system cost overruns? 
3. Is estimation error caused by unexpected inflation correlated with an increase 
in weapon system cost overruns? 
4. Did acquisition reforms have an impact on cost overruns when defense 
industry consolidation, inflation, changes in the defense budget, and war are 
considered?  
 
  This is not an exhaustive list of the factors potentially correlated with defense 
weapon system cost overruns.  However these are many of the major factors and by 
modeling them, this study will add greatly to the understanding of the causes of defense 
cost overruns. 
Scope and Methodology 
This research is limited to the study of contract cost overruns on Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) I programs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force from 1970 until 2002.  
Defense contract cost overruns for each cross-sectional unit are analyzed using a panel 
regression model with annual contract cost overruns over time as the dependant variable and 
defense budgets, industry concentration, inflation, acquisition reforms, and war as the 
independent variables.  The panel regression model is more robust than a hypothesis test 
design or case studies that are common in past research because the panel model reveals the 
5 
 relative importance of each variable and its contribution to cost overruns in a dynamic 
setting.  Consistent with past studies such as Searle (1997) and Holbrook (2003), this 
research investigates cost overruns by contract type and program phase.  Table 4 lists 
these four models. 
Table 4. Model Descriptions 
Model Description 
Model 1 Fixed Price Cost Overruns 
Model 2 Cost-Plus Cost Overruns 
Model 3 Production Cost Overruns 
Model 4 Research and Development Cost Overruns 
 
Organization of the Study 
 This chapter presented the problem of cost overruns in defense weapon system 
purchases.  Additionally, this chapter identified the research questions that will be 
explored throughout this thesis.   Chapter II will present a detailed discussion of past 
research on cost overruns, followed by a discussion of the data and methods used in this 
research in Chapter III, a presentation of analysis and results in Chapter IV, and a 
discussion of key findings in Chapter V. 
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 II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews the previous research on the subject of cost overruns 
incurred by DoD in the acquisition of weapon systems.  Additionally, this chapter 
summarizes the major efforts by DoD and the United States Congress to reform that 
process.  Also, in the years following the various acquisition reforms, much research has 
been conducted assessing the impact of those reforms on cost growth. This chapter will 
review that literature and summarize its major findings.  Additionally, while past research 
on cost growth has been split with some researchers investigating its causes and others 
studying the impact of acquisition reform, this literature review will illustrate that those 
two areas of research are really one and that an aggregate model of cost growth that 
accounts for these factors in a single model is needed. 
Past Research on Cost Growth 
As implied above, much research on cost overruns has been conducted, ranging 
from case studies that investigate managerial issues contributing to cost growth, to 
descriptive studies that measure and characterize cost growth.   Table 5 is a summary of 
some of this research.  A discussion of selected research follows. 
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 Table 5. Summary of Research on Weapon System Cost Overruns 
Summary of Research on Weapon System Cost Overruns 
Author Year Method Main Findings 
Singleton 1991 Case Study Factors Causing Cost Growth: Funding Instability, 
Configuration Instability, Technology Readiness  
RAND 1993,1996  Descriptive  20% Average Cost Growth in ACAT 1 Programs,  
Program Maturity Affects Cost Growth 
Czelusniak and 
Rogers 
1997 Descriptive Funding Instability from Contingency Operations 
lead to cost growth 
GAO  1998 Descriptive DoD expects significant savings from defense 
industry consolidation 
McNutt 1998 Case Study Complex Acquisition Process, Poor Portfolio 
Management, Increased Cycle Time, and Funding 
Instability drive Cost Growth 
Swank et al. 2000  Descriptive   40% Cost Growth in Research and Development 
Programs 
Coleman et al  2003 Empirical   No Relationship between Cost and Schedule Growth 
GAO 2005 Descriptive Consolidation of the Defense industry is at a 50 year 
high.  DoD expects significant savings from 
consolidation 
 
In her 1991 thesis, Singleton attempted to predict “a range of potential cost 
growth around the most probable cost estimate” (Singleton, 1991:7).  She accomplished 
this goal by “researching the cost growth experienced in recent programs and 
categorizing (those) programs based on several factors” (Singleton, 1991:7) spelled out in 
her thesis.  She then identified the top three contributing factors through a selection 
process involving a panel of cost analysts.  Her research identified technical risk, 
configuration stability, and schedule risk as the top three factors contributing to cost 
growth. 
According to a 1998 GAO report entitled Defense Industry: Consolidation and 
Options for Preserving Competition, the Department of Defense has identified 12 
industrial market sectors comprised of types of products or weapons systems important to 
U.S. national security interests (GAO, 1998:2).  The report lists ten of those sectors and 
8 
 identifies them as experiencing industry consolidation between 1990 and 1998 (GAO, 
1998:10).  The report goes on to say that “DoD expects significant cost savings will result 
from (this) consolidation (GAO, 1998:2).”  
 
Table 6. Reduction in the Number of Prime Contractors 
(GAO, 1998:10) 
 
 
 
Following their 1998 report, the GAO issued another report in 2005 called 
“Consolidation and Options for preserving Competition” in which they state  “The sharp 
decline in spending by DoD since 1985 has resulted in a dramatic consolidation of the 
defense industry, which is now more concentrated than at any time in more than a half 
century.” (GAO, 2005: 1) and then go on to reiterate that the DoD expected significant 
savings from consolidation. (GAO, 2005:2) 
 Coleman, Summerville, and Dameron (2003) investigated the relationship 
between cost growth and schedule growth.  They used data from the Selected Acquisition 
Report (SAR) compiled in the 1993 RAND Cost Growth Database to perform this 
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 analysis.  The major conclusion of the analysis was that there is no correlation between 
schedule length and cost growth (Coleman et al, 2003:120).   One limitation of this 
research is that when the requirements of a program change significantly, the estimate in 
the SAR is rebaselined.  This rebaselining can obscure the actual cost and schedule 
overruns.   If the researchers did not account for this technique, and there is no evidence 
that they did, then the conclusion that cost and schedule growth are unrelated is in doubt. 
One common theme in much of the research on cost overruns is the idea that 
funding instability causes cost overruns.  As far back as 1991, Singleton identified this as 
one of the key contributing factors.  McNutt (1998) argues among other things that the 
complex acquisition and budget process leads managers to make suboptimal funding 
choices that lead to poor portfolio management and a chronic under-funding of long-term 
projects (McNutt, 1998:307).   He suggests that this instability in funding leads to 
increased acquisition cycle time which in turn leads to increased cost overruns.   In 
support of this idea, a quick glance at Figure 2 reveals a clear countercyclical relationship 
between cost overruns and changes in defense budgets: 
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Figure 2. Air Force Cost Overruns and Percent Change in Budgets 
 
This idea is summed up well by the US Senate in a recent report on defense 
acquisition policy in which they state: “….the committee believes that one answer can be 
found in the inability of the Department (of Defense) to address the budget and program 
instability issues. …Funding and requirements instability continue to drive up costs and 
delay eventual fielding of new systems” (Kadish et al., 2005:1).   
Past research also suggests that funding needs related to contingency operations 
such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq also contribute to cost growth.  Christensen et al. 
(1999) characterize this finding by Czelusniak and Rogers (1997) as follows: 
“…Czelusniak and Rodgers (1997) report that Congressional decisions to shift funds to 
near-term priorities external to the program (e.g. unplanned contingency operations in 
Bosnia) account for up to one-half of the cost growth in major weapons systems.” 
11 
 Finally, the idea that estimation error can lead to cost overruns is briefly 
suggested by Christensen et al. (1999:1) and Drezner et al. (1993:iii).  Essentially, the 
idea is that cost overruns can be caused by poor initial estimates of program cost.  One 
way estimates can be inaccurate is if they fail to accurately capture inflation.  This is 
especially true in programs of longer duration or high dollar value.  An estimate of 
inflation prepared by the DoD Comptroller is included in all cost estimates.  If inflation is 
unexpectedly high in a given year then that forecasting error could contribute to cost 
overruns. 
Acquisition Reform 
In an attempt to make the DoD more responsive and efficient in the procurement 
of weapon systems, Congress, the DoD, and the individual military services have 
instituted various reforms to the acquisitions process.   Major reforms and initiatives from 
1971 to 2003 are listed in Table 7. However, a quick glance at the table reveals the 
challenge in trying to discern the impact of a given acquisition reforms.  Almost every 
year, some type of reform effort is undertaken and it becomes difficult to identify the 
major reforms. 
12 
 Table 7. Acquisition Initiatives and Legislation (Scofield, 2003:19) 
 
 
However, past research illustrates that four reforms are singular in their scope and 
potential impact on cost overruns.  Table 8 presents a list of those key acquisition 
13 
 reforms, laws, and studies that have been highlighted by past research and based on a 
review of this research, four are selected for study. 
  
Table 8. Key Reforms Identified by Past Research 
ACQUISITION REFORM/STUDY Ye
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Nunn-McCurdy Act 1982 X 1
Grace Commision 1983 X X 2
DoD Authorization Act 1984 X 1
Packard Commission 1986 X X X X X 5
Goldwater Nichols Act 1986 X 1
Defense Management Review 1989  X 1
DAWIA 1990 X 1
National Performance Review I 1993 X 1
FASA 1994 X X 2
Cost as an Independent Variable 1995 X 1
Clinger-Cohen Act 1996 X 1
Evolutionary Acquisition 2000 X 1  
 
Nunn McCurdy Act of 1982 
 The Nunn McCurdy Act of 1982 was enacted by Congress in an attempt to 
control the spending of the Department of Defense and to force the DoD to provide 
information to Congress when a major program experiences significant cost overruns.  To 
accomplish this goal, the bill called for “the termination of weapons programs whose 
total costs grew by more than 25 percent above original estimates, unless they were 
certified as critical systems by the Secretary of Defense or if the cost growth was 
attributable to certain specified changes in the program” (Center for Defense 
Information:2005).  
14 
 Such a clear attempt by Congress to curtail cost overruns in defense weapons 
systems deserves study.  Yet, over twenty years later there has been little research to 
evaluate its impact. 
Packard Commission of 1986 
 According to Cooper “the ‘modern’ era of acquisition reform commenced 
in 1986 with the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard 
Commission) (Cooper, 2002:11).”   The commission was chartered by President Reagan 
in late 1985 to study the defense acquisition process and was chaired by former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense David Packard.  The primary conclusion of the study was that 
“major weapons systems cost too much, take too long to field,” and as a result, end up 
fielding “obsolete technology” (Searle, 1997: 32).  In response to this, the Packard 
Commission offered the following recommendations presented in Table 9: 
Table 9. Packard Commission Recommendations 
(Modified from Searle, 1997:34) 
 
Packard Commission Recommendations 
Streamline the Acquisition Process 
Increase Tests and Prototyping 
Change the Organizational Culture 
Improve Planning 
Model the DoD after a Competitive Firm 
 
 Unlike the Nunn-McCurdy, act, the impact of the Packard Commission 
recommendation have been extensively researched by authors such as Searle (1997), 
Christensen et al. (1999), and Holbrook (2003).  And, the conclusion drawn by all of 
these studies is virtually the same.  The conventional wisdom is that either the Packard 
15 
 Commission recommendations made no difference (Holbrook: 2003:81) or that the cost 
performance of defense contracts actually got worse in the period following Packard 
(Christensen et al.,1999:257). 
 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990  
  “The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 
1990 (Public Law 101-510) required the Secretary of Defense…to establish education 
and training standards, requirements, and courses for the DoD civilian and military 
workforce” (Cooper, 2002:12).   While not traditionally viewed as an acquisition reform, 
DAWIA “shaped the way education and training is provided to DoD acquisition 
personnel…” (Cooper, 2002:12) and therefore is considered by this research to be worthy 
of study.  Intuitively, a well-trained acquisition workforce should be able to deliver 
increased combat capability more quickly and at a reduced cost.  
 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act was enacted in 1994 and was “the first 
major rewrite of government procurement regulations in a decade” (Cooper, 2002:15).  
The primary intent of FASA was to empower the acquisition workforce to make 
decisions about how to manage their programs.  This was a movement away from the 
restrictive and centralized procurement practices of the past (Cooper, 2002:15).    Other 
key provision of FASA were the increased use of performance based contract payments, 
and the push towards more “commercial or off the shelf products” (Cooper, 2002:18).  
16 
 Most important for this study were the requirements that contractors have a certified cost 
accounting system that complies with accepted cost accounting standards and also the 
increased scrutiny of a contractor’s past performance in the source selection criterion of 
major weapon system purchases.   Clearly these provisions should have led to decreases 
in weapon system cost and should be investigated.  Indeed, in their 1999 paper, 
Christensen et al. suggest that the impact of the FASA reform is worthy of study but that 
some time would have to pass before its impact could be felt.  (Christensen et al, 
1999:258).  Now, twelve years after the reform, the impact can be modeled and studied. 
 
Clinger-Cohen Act  of 1996 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 is an extension of the ideas of FASA.  So similar 
are the provisions of Clinger-Cohen that Holbrook used the phrase FASA II to describe it 
(Holbrook, 2003:20).  As such, the Clinger-Cohen Act and FASA are modeled as a single 
reform in this study. 
 
Challenges in Implementing Reforms
 One challenge in evaluating the impact of acquisition reform is deciding when to 
consider a reform to be implemented.    This is an important decision if the effects of the 
reforms are to be studied properly.  Clearly, if Congress passes a law restructuring the 
defense acquisition process today, it should not be considered fully implemented 
tomorrow.  Intuitively, one would expect any reform of a large bureaucracy to take some 
time to be implemented and an even longer time before its results appeared in contract 
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 cost data.  Indeed, organizational behavior literature suggests that changes can take years 
to become fully implemented within a large bureaucracy (Geert et al., 2002:11).  The 
issue is eloquently described by Geert et al. in their 2002 working paper A Framework for 
Assessing Commitment to Change.  Process and Context Variables of Organizational 
Change. 
 “Time plays at least in two ways a central role in the change process. First, 
implementation of change goes through different phases. ..These phases take time. 
Common to all the implementation models is the message that efforts to bypass 
these phases seldom yield a satisfactory result (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999: 
303).” 
  
 In an organization as large and complex as the Department of Defense, one would 
expect acquisition reforms would take some time to fully implement.  Compounding the 
problem is the frequency with which such reforms occur.  No doubt, different reforms 
have been implemented to varying degrees and with varying effectiveness.   In his 2002 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Thesis, Michael Cooper alludes to this problem when 
he lists “Reduce the number of Reform Initiatives” (Cooper, 1997:97) as one of its 
recommendations.  The paper goes on to emphasize that reforms need to be clearly 
identified and prioritized to the workforce (Cooper, 1997:97). 
 In his 2000 article in the Acquisition Review Quarterly, Raymond W. Reig 
confronts the problem of identifying when a reform has been implemented and attempts 
to measure or baseline the effective date of modern acquisition reform.  Choosing one 
date as the effective date for some many disparate initiatives proves to be a formidable 
challenge.  However, he does settle on a date of January 1996 as the date that acquisition 
reforms “first became effective within the field…” (Reig, 2000:38).   He then states that 
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 any program with a Milestone III (Milestone C) that occurred after July 1996, would be 
beneficially affected by acquisition reform.  However, one must ask how reasonable it is 
to choose one date by which all acquisition reforms are considered implemented.  
Acquisition Reform Cost Research 
“Despite the implementation of more than two dozen regulatory and 
administrative initiatives, there has been no substantial improvement in the cost 
performance of defense programs for more than 30 years.” 
 
(Christensen et al., 1999:252) 
 
The second major area of research on cost overruns looked at whether acquisition 
reforms had any measurable impact on cost overruns.  The consensus among this research 
is that acquisition reforms had no measurable impact on cost overruns.  However, this 
research is subject to some limitations including a subjective treatment date and omitted 
variable bias.  Table 10 is a summary of key research in this area: 
Table 10. Acquisition Reform Impact on Cost Overruns 
  
 
Sear
 H
Phillips (2004)
Acquisition Reform had no significant Impact on contract 
cost performance
olbrook (2003)
Christensen et al. (1999)
Cost Overruns worsened after the Packard Commission
Cost Estimating Error is a causal factor in cost overruns
le (1997)
Main FindingsAuthor (Year)
 
 
Choosing one date as the effective date of acquisition reform is a convenient tool 
for analysis employed by all of this research.  Phillips used December 31, 1996 as the 
treatment date for comparing pre-reform and post-reform cost growth.  Using Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR) data derived from the 1993 RAND cost growth database he 
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 concluded that acquisition reform has had no impact on cost growth  (Phillips, 2004:70).  
Holbrook arrived at a similar conclusion looking at data from the DAES database.  Also 
looking at data from the DAES database, Christensen, Searle, and Vickery used 
December 31, 1991 as the treatment date for determining the impact of the Packard 
Commission’s recommendations (Christensen et al., 1999:254) and concluded the 
following: 
“Based on a review of 269 completed defense contracts, we found that the 
Packard Commission’s recommendations did not reduce cost overruns.  This 
result is consistent with similar research involving an analysis of cost growth on 
197 defense programs (Drezner, Jarvaise, Hough, and Norton, 1993).”  
 
 Despite the apparent clarity of these results there is some question in the wisdom of 
choosing a single date to represent the effective date of all acquisition reforms as was done 
by Holbrook and Phillips.   Additionally, none of these studies include other previously 
identified variables such as changes in defense budgets, industry concentration, inflation, or 
war.  The absence of these variables could bias the result of their research.  Christensen et al. 
recognized this issue when they identified threats to internal validity in the footnotes of their 
research article. 
 To their credit, this research was a needed first step in studying the effectiveness 
of acquisition reform and the researchers did recognize that additional research needed to 
be done.  For example, in his concluding chapter, Holbrook states “There appears to be a 
relationship between acquisition reform events and an immediate change in cost 
performance.  However…this study cannot provide answers as to why these changes 
occurred and why they appear to be short lived” (Holbrook, 2004: 80).  Similarly, Searle, 
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 in his 1997 thesis suggested that future research “investigate other possible causes of the 
dramatic change in cost performance after Dec 31, 1991.”   He went on to say that 
“Perhaps other significant factors not accounted for in this thesis may have been 
responsible for the changes noted”  (Searle, 1997:89). 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter identified the problem of cost overruns in the purchase of defense 
weapon systems and reviewed the attempts of past researchers to explain its causes.  As 
discussed in this chapter, past research identified funding instability, war, cost estimating 
error, and defense industry consolidation as contributing factors but has not been able to 
create an empirical model to measure their relative impact.   Also, this chapter reviewed 
the major acquisition reforms of the last 20 years and discussed the challenge in 
identifying major reforms as well as measuring their effective date.  This research further 
looked at studies that evaluated the effectiveness of acquisition reform and concluded that 
while the consensus among previous research is that acquisition reform had no impact on 
reducing cost overruns, that research is subject to some limitations which potentially bias 
their results and suggest that further study is needed. 
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 III. Data and Methods 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter explains the methods employed in this research effort and describes 
the data used to answer the research questions discussed in Chapter I.  The primary 
purpose of this research is to develop an empirical model that can be used to study the 
impact of acquisition reforms, changing levels of defense industry consolidation and 
defense budgets, unexpected inflation, and war on the cost of defense weapon systems.  
To accomplish this goal, data was collected on the dependent variable (cost overruns of 
weapon systems contracts for Air Force, Army, and Navy) and the independent variables 
(defense budgets, industry concentration levels, acquisition reforms, predicted and actual 
inflation rates, and war).   
The relationships between the variables are then described using fixed-effects 
panel regression models to describe cost overruns in fixed-price and cost-plus contract 
types as well as the production and research and development program phases.  This 
chapter provides a brief discussion of the advantages of the fixed-effect panel model in 
cross-sectional time series analysis, an overview of the model data, and a detailed 
description of the econometric analysis that is employed in the next chapter.   
Description of the Models 
  In total, four models are presented.  Models 1 and 2 describe how cost overruns 
relate to each contract type and Models 3 and 4 describe cost overruns by program phase.  
Recall that past researchers such as Searle (1997), Christensen et al. (1999), and 
Holbrook (2003) also studied contract cost overruns by contract type and program phase.  
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 This is because the different types and phases are expected to behave differently.  For 
example, the cost-plus contract type is expected to put more risk on the government. 
Consequently, the overall magnitude of cost overruns for this contract type is expected to 
be greater.  
 
Advantages of the Fixed-Effects Panel Model 
As stated above, this research employs a fixed effects panel model to analyze 
annual cost overruns of the Air Force, Army, and Navy.  Since the cost overruns are over 
time and involve multiple cross sections, a panel model is the ideal analytical tool.  Cost 
overruns could have been studied using a simple time series regression model using 
ordinary least squares regression.  However, modeling the data as a panel model “creates 
more variability, through combining variation across micro-units with variation over 
time.”  This increased variability makes the fixed-effects panel model more robust to 
multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2003:302). 
Perhaps more important is that since a panel model accounts for heterogeneity in 
the cross-sectional values, it can correct for omitted variables.  This is important because 
omitted variables bias the regression results. (Kennedy, 2003:303)  Put simply, the issue 
of omitted variables is a serious limitation of past research on cost overruns. The fact that 
the panel model can account for this problem is perhaps the biggest single advantage of 
this technique. 
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 Data 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the annual percentage of contract cost 
overruns on ACAT I weapons programs for the United States Air Force, Army and Navy 
from 1970 to 2002.  Contract cost overruns were measured using Earned Value 
Management (EVM) data from the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) 
database.  Cost overruns from contracts contained in the DAES database were separated 
by service and by contract type and phase and then used to calculate average percentage 
contract cost overruns per year.  
There are two main sources of cost information for defense weapon systems:  The 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 
Database (DAES).  SARs were created by the Department of Defense in 1967 in order to 
generate a consistent database of cost, schedule, and performance information on major 
defense acquisition programs.  The DAES database is a collection of cost information on 
ACAT 1 programs by acquisition contract (Holbrook, 2003:33).” 
Compilations of SAR cost and schedule information have been used extensively 
in past cost research.  However, due to the highly aggregated nature of the data in the 
SAR database (Christensen et al, 1999:252), there are several limitations to this database 
that reduce its effectiveness in explaining cost growth (Jarvaise et al., 1996:11).  
Consequently, for this research the DAES database is used.     
In the DAES database is the Earned Value Management (EVM) data derived from 
contractor reports called Cost Performance Reports (CPRs).  EVM is a tool used by 
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 contractors and the government to track costs on defense contracts (Holbrook, 2003:25).  
Since each EVM system is validated by the government prior to use, the data from the 
EVM system is considered valid (Searle, 1997:42). 
The cost data used in this study covers ACAT I contracts from 1970 to 2002 and 
consists of 14,003 entries from 186 ACAT I programs from the Air Force, Army and 
Navy.  Table 11 shows the number of programs per service and Figure 3 is an excerpt 
from the database: 
Table 11. Number of Programs per Service 
Service Number of Programs 
Air Force  61 
Army 50 
Navy 75 
 
SUBMITDATE Contract ID Service ProgramName ACWP BCWP BCWS BAC Contract Type Program Phase
3/25/1976 N0003074C0100 Navy TRIDENT SUB 1005.5 973.7 987.9 2028.6 CP DEVELOPMENT
4/25/1976 N0001975C0424 Navy F/A-18 C/D 20.6 21.8 21.9 1020.2 CP DEVELOPMENT
5/25/1976 DAAK4072C0106 Army PATRIOT 532.7 522 529.7 569.2 CP DEVELOPMENT
5/25/1976 DAAK4072C0773 Army STINGER 64.5 53.6 55.3 62.9 CP DEVELOPMENT
6/25/1976 F1962870C0218 Air Force E-3A Hawkeye 697 662.2 673.9 768.3 CP DEVELOPMENT
6/25/1976 F1962870C0218 Air Force E-3A Hawkeye 142.9 142.2 146.6 259.3 FPI PRODUCTION
6/25/1976 F1962874C0127 Air Force E-4 (AABNCP) 80.4 81.7 83.4 181.3 CP DEVELOPMENT
6/25/1976 N0001976C0261 Navy F/A-18 C/D 23.3 22.9 23.1 330.6 CP DEVELOPMENT
6/25/1976 F3365770C0300 Air Force F-15 827 803 804 809.3 CP DEVELOPMENT
6/25/1976 F3365775C0310 Air Force F-16 114.2 109.1 127.7 389.5 FPI DEVELOPMENT
6/25/1976 N0003074C0100 Navy TRIDENT SUB 1105.4 1084.2 1087.5 2026.2 CP DEVELOPMENT
7/25/1976 F3365775C0310 Air Force F-16 127.1 119.8 140 399 FPI DEVELOPMENT
8/25/1976 DAAJ0175C0360 Army AH-64 Apache 12.8 13 11.6 32.5 CP DEVELOPMENT
8/25/1976 N0001975C0267 Navy C/MH-53E 36.6 32.7 34.5 69.7 CP DEVELOPMENT
8/25/1976 DAAA0976C2001 Army COPPERHEAD 11.6 11.3 11.5 41.6 CP DEVELOPMENT
8/25/1976 N0001975C0424 Navy F/A-18 C/D 49.5 51.9 52.9 1022.2 CP DEVELOPMENT
8/25/1976 F3365776C0100 Air Force F-15 135.6 136.9 134.8 852.9 FPIF PRODUCTION
8/25/1976 F0470475C0014 Air Force Minuteman III 18.4 19.4 18.6 75.8 FPI PRODUCTION  
Figure 3. Excerpt from DAES Database 
 
A complete list of programs studied and the number of contract entries per program can 
be found in Appendix A. 
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 To identify the lead service and program name, an identifier from the DAES 
database called a PNO number was matched with a list of PNO numbers compiled by 
Carden in the completion of his 2006 AFIT Master’s Thesis.  Data was then further 
grouped by contract type into fixed-price contracts and cost-plus contracts.   Contracts 
that were a mix of the two types or contracts where the contract was unknown were not 
included in either the fixed-price contract model or the cost-plus contract model.  
Additionally, the contracts were segregated by program phase into production contracts 
and research and development (R&D) contracts.   Again, contracts where the phase was 
unknown were not included in either of these models.  Contracts where no lead service 
was known or contracts that were managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) were also not included in this study.  Table 12 shows the number of contract 
entries in the database per contract type: 
 
Table 12. Number of Contract Entries per Service and Contract Type 
Service Fixed Price Cost-Plus Grand Total 
Air Force 3485 1588 5073 
Army 907 1839 2746 
Navy 3243 2247 5490 
Grand Total 7635 5674 13309 
 
Table 13 shows the number of contract entries in the database per program phase: 
Table 13. Number of Contract Entries per Service and Program Phase 
Service Production Development Grand Total 
Air Force 2267 2151 4418 
Army 855 1385 2240 
Navy 2924 1418 4342 
Grand Total 6046 4954 11000 
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 The dependent variable in this analysis is the annual percentage of contract cost 
overruns per service per year.  These values were derived from the EVM data of each 
contract entry by first using the following formula for percentage contract cost variance 
(%CV) from the Earned Value Management Gold Card on all contract entries: 
                100)(% ⋅−=
BCWP
BCWPACWPCV                   (1)  
 
where:  %CV  = Percentage Cost Variance 
BCWP = Budgeted Cost of Work Performed 
  ACWP = Actual Cost of Work Performed 
 
Then, the %CV from each contract entry is aggregated by year, service, program type, 
and program phase and an annual cost overrun percentage is calculated using a weighted 
average of the individual %CV’s.  Graphs of cost overruns over time and for each model 
are found in Chapter IV. 
 
Independent Variables  
 Table 14 lists the independent variables used in this analysis.  A discussion of 
each variable type follows. 
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 Table 14. List of Independent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Variable Description Variable Name 
Percent Change in Operations and Maintenance Budget ombudgetpercent 
Percent Change in Procurement Budget procbudgetpercent 
Percent Change in Research and Development Budget rdbudgetpercent 
Industry Concentration (CR4) concentrationcr4 
Unexpected Inflation inflationdifference 
Packard Commission  packard 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) fasa 
Nunn-McCurdy Act nunnmccurdy 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) dawia 
War war 
 
 
Defense Budgets 
In the models presented in this research, the annual percentage change in defense 
budgets is a proxy for funding instability.  Annual budget data is obtained from Chapter 6 
of the National Defense Budget Estimates for 2006, a report prepared annually by the 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller).   Budget data from this document 
is collected per cross-sectional unit (Air Force, Army, and Navy), and per appropriation.  
For the purposes of this study, the budget remaining after Procurement and R&D funds 
are subtracted is referred to as the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget.  Finally, 
budget values are then converted into annual percentage changes to be consistent with the 
dependent variable and for ease of interpretation of model coefficients.   A table of 
budget amounts for each service is presented in Appendix C. 
 
Acquisition Reforms 
The acquisition reforms studied in this research are coded as dummy variables 
with a “1” representing the presence of the reform and a “0” indicating that the reform is 
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 not in effect.  The Nunn-McCurdy act was enacted in 1982 so it is coded as a “1” from 
1982 until 2002.  The Packard Commission recommendations were issued in 1986 so 
from 1986 until 1994, Packard is coded as a “1”.  In 1994, the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) was enacted and superseded many of the Packard Commission 
reforms so after 1994, Packard is coded as a “0” and from 1994 until 2002, FASA is 
coded as a “1”.  Finally, in 1990, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) became law so from 1990 until 2002, DAWIA is coded as a “1”. 
 
War 
War is also modeled as a dummy variable and is coded as a “1” for the Vietnam 
War, the Gulf War, the conflict in Bosnia in 1999, and the period after September 11th.   
 
Industry Consolidation 
 The level of consolidation in the defense industry is measured by an industry 
concentration ratio called the CR4.  The CR4 measures “how much of the total output of 
an industry is produced by the largest (four) firms in that industry….  When an industry 
is composed of a very large number of firms, each of which is very small, the (CR4) is 
close to zero.  When four or fewer firms produce all of an industry’s output, the (CR4) is 
close to 1” (Baye, 2003:233). 
 CR4 data was gathered from the Economic Census reports generated every five 
years by the US Census Bureau.   For the purposes of this study, North American 
Industry Classification System (NAIC) category 366411, Aerospace Products and Parts 
Manufacturing represents the industry concentration of the Air Force, the Army 
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 concentration level is represented by NAIC 3795, Tank and Tank Components, and the 
Navy is represented by NAIC 3731, Ship Building and Repair.  Figure 4 is a graph of the 
concentration ratios from 1970-2002: 
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Figure 4. Industry Concentration Ratios by Service 
 
Unexpected Inflation 
 Recall that cost estimating error was identified in past research as a causal factor 
in cost overruns (Christensen et al., 1999:251).   One factor that contributes to cost 
estimating error is error in the inflation prediction of a cost estimate.  Future inflation of 
defense spending is forecasted by OSD Comptroller and as they discuss in Chapter 5 of 
National Defense Budget Estimates for 2006, forecasts of inflation are adjusted several 
times before the final forecast.   Even then, the forecast does not exactly match the actual 
inflation in that year.   
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  Given this discrepancy, this research models a variable called Unexpected 
Inflation and tests whether it is correlated with cost overruns.  Unexpected inflation is 
defined as the difference between actual inflation and expected inflation in the year the 
money is used.  
In reality, each service and appropriation has a different annual prediction of 
expected inflation and a different actual inflation.  However, for this model, the aggregate 
difference is used for each cross section (Air Force, Army, and Navy).  Table 18 displays 
the expected and actual inflation values for each year as well as the calculated difference 
referred to in this research as Unexpected Inflation.  The availability of historical budget 
and forecast data at the time of this research precludes the use of values before 1980. 
Table 15. Unexpected Inflation in DoD 
Actual Inflation Expected Inflation Unexpected Inflation
1980 11.7% 5.9% 5.8%
1981 10.4% 8.1% 2.3%
1982 7.5% 8.9% -1.4%
1983 3.6% 6.3% -2.7%
1984 3.0% 3.7% -0.7%
1985 3.3% 4.5% -1.2%
1986 2.6% 4.0% -1.4%
1987 2.9% 3.4% -0.5%
1988 3.6% 4.5% -0.9%
1989 3.9% 3.4% 0.5%
1990 3.0% 3.0% 0.0%
1991 4.6% 4.0% 0.6%
1992 1.9% 2.9% -1.0%
1993 2.9% 3.7% -0.8%
1994 2.3% 2.0% 0.3%
1995 2.0% 2.2% -0.2%
1996 2.2% 2.8% -0.6%
1997 2.2% 2.6% -0.4%
1998 2.3% 2.2% 0.1%
1999 2.2% 2.0% 0.2%
2000 2.5% 2.2% 0.3%
2001 3.0% 2.8% 0.2%
2002 2.7% 3.0% -0.3%  
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 Methods 
The model proposed in this research is that contract cost overruns are a function 
of budgets, industry concentration, inflation, acquisition reform, and war such that: 
 
 (2) 
 
 
The fixed-effects panel model notation is: 
itiitit vxy εβα +++=                        (3) 
where          i = {Air Force, Army, Navy} 
                                                                 j = {1970,1971,…2002} 
 
The dependant variable is assumed to have lag 1 autocorrelation so an AR 1 
disturbance term is added to the model (Stata, 2005:311).  Consequently, the error term is 
represented as follows: 
                                                 ittiit ηρεε += −1,                                       (4) 
 
Using this notation, the basic representation of all four models is: 
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The first step in this analysis was to check for stationarity of the dependent 
variable for each of the four models.  According to Kennedy, regression analysis of panel 
data could result in spurious correlations if the dependent variable is non-stationary 
(Kennedy, 2003:325).  This research tests for stationarity by two methods.  The first 
method is by inspection of a time series plot of each dependent variable.  The second 
method is a more formal test called the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test.  The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test tests if a variable “follows a unit root process….. The null hypothesis 
is that the variable contains a unit root, and the alternative is that the variable was 
generated by a stationary process” (Stata, 2005). 
According to Makridakis et al. in their Forecasting Methods and Applications 
text, the four assumptions of multiple linear regression are model form, independence of 
residuals (lack of autocorrelation), constant variance (homoskedasticity), and normality 
of residuals (Forecasting, 1998:259).    However, a reading of Kennedy’s A Guide to 
Econometrics illustrates that the fixed-effects panel model is robust to normality and is 
also effective at dealing with omitted variable bias that would make model form a more 
serious concern.  Therefore, this research tests each panel model only for independence 
or a lack of autocorrelation and homoskedasticity or constant variance. 
Autocorrelation means that model residuals are not independent of their lagged 
values (Forecasting, 1998:265).   The presence of autocorrelation in time series models 
such as the panel model is a serious concern to econometricians (Kennedy, 2003:134) 
because it introduces bias to the model coefficients.  To measure autocorrelation, the 
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 Baltagi Wu Locally Best Invariant (LBI) test was calculated.  The Baltagi-Wu LBI is an 
extension of the Durbin-Watson statistic to unbalanced panel models and tests a model 
for lag 1 autocorrelation (Stata, Longitudinal/Panel Data, 2005:316). 
Like the Durbin-Watson statistic, the Baltagi-Wu LBI ranges from 0 to 4 with 
values significantly lower or higher than 2 indicating autocorrelation.  The further the 
calculated value is away from 2, the more evidence of positive (less than 2) or negative 
(greater than 2) autocorrelation of the dependant variable.  No p-values are available for 
the Baltagi-Wu LBI, so the presence of autocorrelation is a subjective determination of 
the researcher.  In the event that the AR(1) disturbance term does not adequately account 
for the remaining autocorrelation, lagged dependent variables are added until the Baltagi-
Wu LBI approaches 2.0 
To test for homoskedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test is employed.  The null 
hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is that the variance is equal to zero. 
Heteroskedasticity “…does not lead to biased coefficients.  But when the 
homoskedasticity assumption is violated, the coefficients of a regression model are not 
efficient…” (Koeler and Kreuter, 2005:214).    
Finally, lagged values of the acquisition reform and budget variables were added 
to the specified model.  While it is expected that budgets and acquisition reforms are 
correlated with cost overruns, past research suggests that the effect may take a while to 
materialize.  Intuitively, this makes sense.  Changes in the current year’s budget are not 
likely to have as much of an impact on existing contracts as would changes in the 
previous number of years.  Similarly, with acquisition reform, organizational behavior 
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 literature as well as past cost research suggests that reforms take years to be 
implemented.   
As stated by Kennedy in  A Guide to Econometrics,  “It is common for 
practitioners to use selection criteria such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)  or 
adjusted R2 to aid in model specification particularly in determining things like the 
number of lags to include (Kennedy, 2003:88).”  Based on this guidance, this research 
used the AIC to determine the lag structure for the budget and acquisition reform 
variables.   
Summary 
 This research analyzes the cost overruns of defense weapon system contracts by 
contract type and program phase over time.  This chapter describes how a fixed-effects 
panel model is used to create these empirical models.   Additionally, this chapter 
described how the data for the dependent and independent variables was gathered and 
prepared.  Finally, this chapter outlined the process of analysis that is undertaken on each 
of the four models in the next chapter. 
35 
 IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
Recall from previous chapters that cost overruns in defense weapons systems are 
hypothesized to be correlated with changes in defense budgets, levels of concentration in 
the defense industry, unexpected inflation, acquisition reform, and war.  Table 16 is a 
summary of the independent variables and their expected impact on cost overruns derived 
from a review of past research. 
Table 16. Summary of Independent Variables 
Factor Model Variable Expected Impact
Funding Instability Percentage Change in Defense Budgets +
Industry Consolidation Industry Concentration (CR4) -
War War Dummy (Vietnam, Gulf War, Bosnia, Post-
September 11th)
+
Cost Estimating Error Unexpected Inflation in DoD +
Acquisition Reform Dummy Variables for Nunn-McCurdy, Packard, 
FASA, DAWIA
Inconclusive
 
This chapter presents the analysis described in Chapter III and is organized by 
model in the following manner:  
Table 17. Order of Model Presentation 
Model Description 
Model 1 Fixed Price Cost Overruns 
Model 2 Cost-Plus Cost Overruns 
Model 3 Production Cost Overruns 
Model 4 Research and Development Cost Overruns 
  
The general model takes the form of an unbalanced panel model with cost 
overruns as the dependent variable. Additionally, the model has an AR(1) disturbance 
term represented as vi to account for autocorrelation:  
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As described in Chapter III, the dependent variable of each model was checked 
for stationarity and in all four models, the data was found to come from a stationary 
process.  Additionally, all model residuals were tested for heteroskedasticity and found to 
have a constant variance.  All four models were found to have significant autocorrelation 
so an AR(1) disturbance term was added to each model.  This was sufficient in all but the 
research and development model (Model 4) in which the first two lagged dependent 
variables were added.  With this specification change, the R&D model had a Baltagi-Wu 
LBI of 2.07 which indicates that the autocorrelation was properly accounted for.   
 As the model results are discussed and interpreted, recall the expected direction of 
impact of each variable and also the four research questions presented in Chapter I.  
Essentially, the research questions ask two things: how are decreases in budgets (which 
proxy funding instability), industry concentration, unexpected inflation, and war 
correlated with cost overruns and did acquisition reforms have a measurable impact on 
those overruns once the other factors are considered. 
Model 1:  Contract Cost Overruns (Fixed Price Contracts)  
The dependent variable in this model is the average annual cost overrun per 
service per year for fixed-price contracts.  Figure 5 is a visual depiction of these overruns.   
Notice the significant increases and decreases in cost overruns from year to year.  This is 
the behavior that the empirical model seeks to explain. 
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Figure 5. Cost Overruns of Fixed-Price Contracts (1970-2002) 
 
As suggested in Chapter III, acquisition reforms and budgets are expected to be 
most significant as lagged independent variables. The lag structure for model 1 was 
determined by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and is presented in 
Table 18.  For more on how the lags were determined see Appendix D. 
Table 18. Model 1 Lag Structure 
Model 1 Lag Structure (Fixed Price Cost Overruns) 
Variable Using AIC 
Packard 0 
FASA 0 
DAWIA 2 
Nunn-McCurdy 0 
Budgets 0 
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 From the regression results in Table 20 below, the Baltagi-Wu LBI test for lag 1 
autocorrelation has a value of 1.22.   This appears to indicate some remaining 
autocorrelation of the residuals.  However, since an AR(1) disturbance term is already 
included in the model, no additional specification changes are made.  
Using the Breusch-Pagan test shown in Table 19 below, the prob>chi2 is greater 
than 05.=α , therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance and 
conclude that the model does not suffer from heteroskedasticity. 
Table 19. Test for Constant Variance (Model 1) 
Model 1: overrunpercentfp100 
Breusch-Pagan Test (Ho=Constant Variance)   
     
Estimated Results Variance Standard Deviation 
overrunpercent100 79.13309 8.895678 
e 35.06199 5.921317 
u 0 0 
     
chi2(1) = 0.47 
prob>chi2 = 0.4928 
 
 
Using the lag structure from Table 18 above, the Fixed-Effects Panel model 
regression results are as follows: 
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 Table 20. Panel Results Model 1: Fixed-Price Cost Overruns 
Fixed-effects (within) Regression with AR(1) Disturbance Number of obs = 66
Group variable (i): service Number of groups = 3
R-sq:                                                    within = 0.4774 Obs per group: min = 22
between = 0.807 avg = 22
overall = 0.5659 max = 22
F(10,53) 4.84
 Prob > F = 0.0001
overrunpercentfp100 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
O&M Budget (%Change) -31.5013 11.4969 -2.7400 0.0080
Procurement Budget (% Change) -42.8579 12.3519 -3.4700 0.0010
R&D Budget (% Change) -52.4508 14.5825 -3.6000 0.0010
Industry Concentration (CR4) 0.1516 0.3572 0.4200 0.6730
Unexpected Inflation 134.0035 92.9629 -1.4400 0.1550
Packard Commision (Lag 5) -6.3498 3.5810 -1.7700 0.0820
FASA (Lag 2) -21.9962 4.8244 -4.5600 0.0000
Nunn-McCurdy Act (Lag 7) -9.1006 3.9929 -2.2800 0.0270
DAWIA 13.0930 3.3530 3.9000 0.0000
War 1.2876 1.6230 0.7900 0.4310
_cons 11.7176 11.0470 1.0600 0.2940
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.2163
Model 1: Panel Results (Fixed-Price Cost Overruns)
 
 
 The results of this analysis show that budgets are negatively correlated with cost 
overruns as are the Packard Commission reforms, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act (FASA), and the Nunn-McCurdy act while the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) is positively correlated with cost overruns. Table 21 
compares the actual impact of each independent variable on cost overruns of Fixed-Price 
contracts with the expected impact from past research.  Independent variables that are not 
significantly correlated with cost overruns are left blank in the actual impact column. 
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 Table 21. Comparison of Expected and Actual Impact on Cost Overruns 
Model 1 (Fixed-Price Cost Overruns)  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Expected Impact from 
Past Research 
Actual 
Impact 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget - - 
%ΔProcurement Budget - - 
%ΔResearch and Development Budget - - 
Industry Concentration (CR4) -  
Unexpected Inflation +  
Packard Commission  + - 
FASA  - 
Nunn-McCurdy Act  - 
DAWIA   + 
War +  
 
Notice that the percentage change in budgets had the hypothesized impact but that 
the other variables were either not significant or had an impact different than what was 
expected from past research.   Most notable is that the Packard commission reforms are 
correlated with a decrease in cost overruns.  This is contrary to other finding such as 
those by Searle (1997), Christensen et al. (1999) and Holbrook (2003).  Those studies 
either concluded that the Packard Commission recommendations were correlated with an 
increase in cost overruns or they were unable to show any significant relationship.    
The difference in this study is the inclusion of other relevant variables such as 
changing defense budgets.  In effect, this result suggests that the Packard Commission 
and many other acquisition reforms would have reduced cost overruns had the other 
factors such as decreasing defense budgets not overwhelmed their impact. 
Indeed, a quick glance at the summary of regression results in Table 22 reveals 
that the budget variable which is a proxy for funding instability has a much greater 
impact on cost overruns than the acquisition reforms 
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 Table 22. Fixed Price Cost Overrun Model Results 
Model 1 (Fixed-Price Cost Overruns) within R2=.4774 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Coefficient p-value 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget -31.5013 0.0080 
%ΔProcurement Budget -42.85786 0.0010 
%ΔResearch and Development Budget -52.45078 0.0010 
Industry Concentration (CR4) 0.1515838 0.6730 
Unexpected Inflation 134.0035 0.1550 
Packard Commission  -6.349819 0.0820 
FASA -21.99616 0.0000 
Nunn-McCurdy Act -9.100645 0.0270 
DAWIA  13.09299 0 
War 1.287618 0.4310 
 
 In this model, if budgets decrease, cost overruns of fixed price contracts increase.  
Since: 
itiit10it9it8
it7it6it5
it4it3
it2it1i
εvWarβDAWIAβyNunnMcCurdβ
FASAβPackardβInflation Unexpectedβ
ionConcentratIndustry βBudget D&Rβ
Budgett ProcuremenβBudget M&Oβα% OVERRUN COST
+++++
+++
+Δ
+Δ+Δ+= (7) 
 
 
an x percent decrease in budget can be interpreted as a xβ  increase in the value of the 
cost overruns in any given year.  For example, if the procurement budget were to drop by 
1 percent, this model predicts that cost overruns would increase in value by 
approximately (-42.86)*(-0.01) or about 0.43 meaning that that weapon system costs 
would increase by 0.43 percent.  Similarly, if the Research and Development (R&D) 
budget decreased by 10%, cost overruns would be expected to increase in value by 
approximately -52.45*-0.1 or -5.245 meaning that weapon system costs would be 
expected to increase by about 5.2%.    
To clarify this second example, the combined R&D budget for the Air Force, 
Army, and Navy in 2002 was $35.7 billion so a 10 percent decrease would be a cut in 
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 budget of $3.57 billion.  Fixed-price contract cost overruns for that year averaged 
approximately 4.2 percent on $19.4 billion for a cost overrun in that year of about $815 
million.  As stated above, the model predicts that in the event of a 10% cut in R&D 
budgets, cost overruns would increase by 5.2 percent to 9.4% and consequently total 
overruns would increase from $815 million to $1.8 billion.  Said another way, a cut of 
about $3.5 billion in R&D budgets is correlated with an increase in cost overruns of about 
$1 billion.  This is a very important result because it reveals the magnitude and 
significance of funding instability on cost overruns for fixed-price contracts. 
Model 2:  Contract Cost Overruns (Cost-Plus Contracts) 
The dependent variable in Model 2 is the average annual cost overrun per service 
for cost-plus contracts.  Figure 6 is a visual depiction of these overruns.    
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Figure 6. Cost Overruns of Cost-Plus Contracts (1970-2002) 
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 As suggested in Chapter III, acquisition reforms and budgets are expected to be 
most significant as lagged independent variables.  The lag structure for Model 2 was 
determined by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and is represented in 
Table 23 below. 
Table 23. Model 2 Lag Structure 
Model 2 Lag Structure (Cost-Plus Cost Overruns) 
Variable Using AIC 
Packard 7 
FASA 2 
DAWIA 0 
Nunn-McCurdy 2 
Budgets 2 
  
From the regression results in Table 25 below, the Baltagi-Wu LBI test for lag 1 
autocorrelation in model 2 has a value of 1.45.   This possibly indicates some remaining 
autocorrelation of the residuals.  However, since an AR(1) disturbance term is already 
included in the model, no additional specification changes are made.   
Using the Breusch-Pagan test shown in Table 24 below, the prob>chi2 is greater 
than 1.=α , therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance and 
conclude that the model does not suffer from heteroskedasticity. 
Table 24. Test for Constant Variance (Model 2) 
Model 2: overrunpercentcp100  
Breusch-Pagan Test (Ho=Constant 
Variance)   
     
Estimated Results Variance Standard Deviation 
overrunpercent100 6.895362 2.625902 
e 3.620331 1.902717 
u 0 0 
chi2(1) = 0.45 
prob>chi2 = 0.5047 
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 Using the AIC as the lag structure criteria, the regression results are as follows: 
 
Table 25. Model 2 Regression Results 
Fixed-effects (within) Regression with AR(1) Disturbance Number of obs = 66
Group variable (i): service Number of groups = 3
R-sq:                                                    within = 0.4255 Obs per group: min = 22
between = 0.1698 avg = 22
overall = 0.3924 max = 22
F(10,53) 3.93
Prob > F = 0.0005
overrunpercentcp100 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
O&M Budget (%Change) (Lag 2) 5.7208 3.8505 1.4900 0.1430
Procurement Budget (% Change) (Lag 2) 4.6562 4.1008 1.1400 0.2610
R&D Budget (% Change) (Lag 2) 9.7971 4.8812 2.0100 0.0500
Industry Concentration (CR4) 41.8028 31.1135 -1.3400 0.1850
Unexpected Inflation -0.0868 0.0872 -1.0000 0.3240
Packard Commision (Lag 7) -3.4107 0.9626 -3.5400 0.0010
FASA (Lag 2) -2.2000 0.8337 -2.6400 0.0110
Nunn-McCurdy Act (Lag 2) -0.9894 1.0894 -0.9100 0.3680
DAWIA 4.1948 1.0319 4.0700 0.0000
War -1.5748 0.7680 -2.0500 0.0450
_cons 11.4387 3.7272 3.0700 0.0030
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.4548
Model 2: Panel Results (Cost-Plus Cost Overruns)
 
 
The results of this analysis show R&D budgets and O&M budgets are positively 
correlated with cost overruns as is the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) while the Packard Commission reforms, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act (FASA), and war are negatively correlated. Table 26 compares the actual impact of 
each independent variable on cost overruns of Cost-Plus contracts with the expected 
impact from past research.  Independent variables that are not significantly correlated 
with cost overruns are left blank in the actual impact column. 
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Table 26. Comparison of Expected and Actual Impact on Cost Overruns 
Model 2 (Cost-Plus Cost Overruns)  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Expected Impact 
from Past Research 
Actual 
Impact 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget - + 
%ΔProcurement Budget -  
%ΔResearch and Development Budget - + 
Industry Concentration (CR4) -  
Unexpected Inflation +  
Packard Commission  + - 
FASA  - 
Nunn-McCurdy Act   
DAWIA   + 
War + - 
 
Notice that the all variables in this model were either not significant or had an 
impact different than what was expected from past research.   As with the Fixed-Price 
model, the Packard commission reform is again correlated with a decrease in cost 
overruns.  This is again contrary to the findings of others like Searle (1997), Christensen 
et al (1999) and Holbrook (2003).  Those studies either concluded that the Packard 
Commission recommendations were correlated with an increase in cost overruns or they 
were unable to show any significant relationship.   Again, the difference in this study is 
the inclusion of other relevant variables in the model.  In effect, this result suggests that 
the Packard Commission and many other acquisition reforms would have reduced cost 
overruns had the other factors not overwhelmed their impact. 
One major difference between the cost-plus model and the fixed-price model is 
that in this model, R&D and O&M budgets are now positively correlated with cost 
overruns.  This means that an increase in R&D or O&M budgets would result in an 
increase in cost-overruns for cost-plus contracts.  This is counter to the research that 
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 suggested that decreases in budgets would result in increases in cost overruns.  It is worth 
noting though that the magnitude of the coefficient is much smaller than in the fixed-
price model so while the direction is unexpected, the predicted impact is much smaller. 
Table 27. Model 2 Coefficients and P-Values 
Model 2 (Cost-Plus Cost Overruns) Within R2=0.4255 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Coefficient p-value 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget 5.720776 0.143 
%ΔProcurement Budget 4.656242 0.261 
%ΔResearch and Development Budget 9.797075 0.05 
Industry Concentration (CR4) 41.80284 0.185 
Unexpected Inflation -0.0868203 0.324 
Packard Commission  -3.410674 0.001 
FASA -2.199959 0.011 
Nunn-McCurdy Act -0.9894184 0.368 
DAWIA  4.19476 0.000 
War -1.574791 0.045 
 
 Also, it is interesting to note that for the second straight model, industry 
concentration is not significant.  As discussed in the literature review, DoD expected 
some cost savings from consolidation.  However, empirically this has not been observed 
in the model of fixed-price or cost-plus contracts.  In fact, with a p-value of .185 and a 
large positive coefficient, the data may suggest the opposite is true.  That is, it could be 
that the increased industry consolidation resulted not in savings but increases in cost 
overruns in defense contracts.  
This leads one to conclude that if there where savings from consolidation it did 
not come from a decrease in the cost overruns in defense contracts.  One has to wonder, if 
the savings are not in the contracts then were they actually DoD savings or just savings to 
the defense contractors as they sized their businesses to fit the market size dictated by the 
post-cold war environment of decreasing defense budgets?   
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  Also worth noting is that acquisition reforms are generally significant and for the 
most part negatively correlated with cost overruns.  This is an important finding because 
past research on acquisition reform’s impact on cost overruns was inconclusive.  The 
only reform that does not fit this pattern is the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act which is again positively correlated with cost overruns.  This suggests 
that cost overruns increased after DAWIA was enacted.  Perhaps this is a result of time 
away from the job for training or perhaps this reveals that there are other omitted 
variables that should be included in the analysis. 
 The final significant variable in the cost-plus contract model is war.  This model 
reveals that war is negatively correlated with cost overruns.  This suggests that the 
presence of war reduces contract cost overruns of cost-plus contracts.  Perhaps this is 
because some weapon system programs are expedited during wartime.  The urgency of 
getting the system out the door precludes the desire of the acquisitions and requirements 
communities to “gold plate” the system requirements.  It could be that that last amount of 
added capability that would have otherwise increased the cost is not included as a result 
of war.   
Model 3:  Contract Cost Overruns (Production Contracts) 
The dependent variable form Model 3 is the average annual cost overrun per 
service for Production contracts.  Figure 7 is a visual depiction of these overruns.    
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Figure 7. Cost Overruns of Production Contracts (1970-2002) 
 
As suggested in Chapter III, acquisition reforms and budgets are expected to be 
most significant as lagged independent variables.  The lag structure for Model 3 was 
determined by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  For more on how the 
lags were determined see Appendix D. 
Table 28. Lag Structure (Model 3) 
Model 3 Lag Structure (Production Cost-Overruns) 
Variable Using AIC 
Packard 4 
FASA 1 
DAWIA 0 
Nunn-McCurdy 0 
Budgets 3 
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 From the regression results in Table 30 below, the Baltagi-Wu LBI test for lag 1 
autocorrelation in the specified model has a value of 1.18.  This appears to indicate some 
remaining autocorrelation of the residuals.  However, since an AR(1) disturbance term is 
already included in the model, no additional specification changes are made.    
Using the Breusch-Pagan test from Table 29, the prob>chi2 is greater than 1.=α , 
therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance and conclude that the 
model does not suffer from heteroskedasticity. 
Table 29. Test for Constant Variance (Model 3) 
Model 3: overrunpercentproc100 (min AIC) 
Breusch-Pagan Test (Ho=Constant 
Variance)   
     
Estimated Results Variance Standard Deviation 
overrunpercent100 22.82678 4.777738 
e 18.2617 4.273371 
u 0 0 
     
chi2(1) = 0.02 
prob>chi2 = 0.8893 
 
 
Using the lag structure from Table 28 above, the regression results are as follows: 
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 Table 30. Regression Results for Model 3: Production Cost Overruns 
Fixed-effects (within) Regression with AR(1) Disturbance Number of obs = 65
Group variable (i): service Number of groups = 3
R-sq:                                                    within = 0.3873 Obs per group: min = 21
between = 0.1069 avg = 21.7
overall = 0.4191 max = 22
F(10,52) 3.29
 Prob > F = 0.0023
overrunpercentproc100 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
O&M Budget (%Change) (Lag 3) -5.0048 6.4718 -0.7700 0.4430
Procurement Budget (% Change)  (Lag 3) -6.1097 6.8092 -0.9000 0.3740
R&D Budget (% Change)  (Lag 3) -7.3763 8.1314 -0.9100 0.3690
Industry Concentration (CR4) 0.0372 0.1799 0.2100 0.8370
Unexpected Inflation 4.8517 49.0284 0.1000 0.9220
Packard Commision (Lag 4) 2.6483 1.8005 1.4700 0.1470
FASA (Lag 1) -3.3674 1.8021 -1.8700 0.0670
Nunn-McCurdy Act -8.4624 2.2343 -3.7900 0.0000
DAWIA 0.5980 2.4087 0.2500 0.8050
War 1.9695 1.0019 1.9700 0.0550
_cons 9.3682 5.2320 1.7900 0.0790
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.1934
Model 3: Panel Results (Production Cost Overruns)
 
 
 The results of this model reveal that the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA), and the Nunn-McCurdy Act are negatively correlated with cost overruns in 
production contracts while the Packard Commission reforms and war are positively 
correlated. Table 31 compares the actual impact of each independent variable on cost 
overruns of Production contracts with the expected impact from past research.  
Independent variables that are not significantly correlated with cost overruns are left 
blank in the actual impact column. 
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 Table 31. Comparison of Expected and Actual Impact on Cost Overruns 
Model 3 (Production Cost Overruns)  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Expected Impact 
from Past Research 
Actual 
Impact 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget -  
%ΔProcurement Budget -  
%ΔResearch and Development Budget -  
Industry Concentration (CR4) -  
Unexpected Inflation +  
Packard Commission  + + 
FASA  - 
Nunn-McCurdy Act  - 
DAWIA    
War + + 
 
Unlike the models of contract type, in this model of production contracts, budgets 
are not significantly correlated with cost overruns.  Also, as with the previous models, 
industry concentration is not significantly correlated with cost overruns or cost savings 
like the DoD expected (GAO, 1998:2).   
Table 32. Model 3 Coefficients and P-Values 
Model 3 (Production Cost Overruns) within R2=0.3873 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Coefficient p-value 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget -5.0048 0.4430 
%ΔProcurement Budget -6.1097 0.3740 
%ΔResearch and Development Budget -7.3763 0.3690 
Industry Concentration (CR4) 0.0372 0.8370 
Unexpected Inflation 4.8517 0.9220 
Packard Commission  2.6483 0.1470 
FASA -3.3674 0.0670 
Nunn-McCurdy Act -8.4624 0.0000 
DAWIA  0.5980 0.8050 
War 1.9695 0.0550 
 
Also, in this model, the Packard Commission recommendations have a p-value of .147 
and a positive correlation with cost overruns.  While only bordering on statistical 
52 
 significance and small in magnitude, this result is consistent with research by Searle 
(1997) and Christensen et al (1999).   
 Further, a trend appears to be emerging that indicates the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) and the Nunn-McCurdy Act are correlated with decreases in 
cost overruns.  Since the Nunn-McCurdy act was enacted with the intent to control 
defense weapon system cost overruns it reassuring to note that it is passage appears to be 
correlated with a decrease in cost overrun though admittedly the magnitude is small.  
 The final significant variable in the production model is war.  In this model, war 
is positively correlated with an increase in cost overruns.  This contrasts with the result of 
the cost-plus contract model.  A possible explanation for this is that products are rushed 
from R&D into production in times of war at an increased production cost.    
Model 4.  Contract Cost Overruns (Research and Development Contracts) 
The dependent variable in the R&D model is the average annual cost overrun per 
service for R&D contracts.  Figure 8 is a visual depiction of these overruns.    
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Figure 8. Cost Overruns of R&D Contracts (1970-2002) 
 
As suggested in Chapter III, acquisition reforms and budgets are expected to be 
most significant as lagged independent variables.  The lag structure for model 1 was 
determined by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  For more on how the 
lags were determined see Appendix D. 
Table 33. Lag Structure (Model 4) 
Model 4 Lag Structure (R&D Cost Overruns) 
Variable Using AIC 
Packard 3 
FASA 1 
DAWIA 0 
Nunn-McCurdy 3 
Budgets 0 
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 From the regression results in Table 34 below, the Baltagi-Wu LBI test for lag 1 
autocorrelation in the specified model has a value of .598.   This appears to indicate 
significant remaining autocorrelation of the residuals.   
Table 34. Regression Results for R&D Contract Model Before Lags 
Fixed-effects (within) Regression with AR(1) Disturbance Number of obs = 66
Group variable (i): service Number of groups = 3
R-sq:                                                    within = 0.3372 Obs per group: min = 22
between = 0.1297 avg = 22
overall = 0.0695 max = 22
F(10,53) 2.7
 Prob > F = 0.0095
overrunpercentrd100 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
O&M Budget (%Change) -12.8577 6.5148 -1.9700 0.0540
Procurement Budget (% Change) -13.2747 6.9110 -1.9200 0.0600
R&D Budget (% Change) -11.4385 8.2788 -1.3800 0.1730
Industry Concentration (CR4) -0.3274 0.4640 -0.7100 0.4830
Unexpected Inflation 45.0504 44.6357 1.0100 0.3170
Packard Commision (Lag 3) 2.1285 1.4304 1.4900 0.1430
FASA (Lag 1) -5.1298 1.9871 -2.5800 0.0130
Nunn-McCurdy Act (Lag 3) -1.7796 2.1933 -0.8100 0.4210
DAWIA 6.1415 1.9696 3.1200 0.0030
War 0.7912 0.9122 0.8700 0.3900
_cons 31.3844 5.6378 5.5700 0.0000
Baltagi-Wu LBI 0.5975
Model 4: Panel Results (R&D Cost Overruns)
 
Also, from the p-value of the Breusch-Pagan test, it is clear that this model suffers 
from heteroskedasticity or non-constant variance of the error terms.  This makes the 
coefficients of the panel model less efficient. 
Table 35. Test for Constant Variance (Model 4) 
Model 4: overrunpercentrd100 (min AIC) 
Breusch-Pagan Test (Ho=Constant Variance)   
Estimated Results Variance 
Standard 
Deviation 
overrunpercent100 51.91042 7.204889 
e 26.03706 5.102652 
u 0 0 
chi2(1) = 7.34 
prob>chi2 = 0.0067 
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 To account for the autocorrelation, the first two lagged dependent variables are 
included as independent variables.  With this change in model specification, the Baltagi-
Wu LBI increases to 2.07 indicating that the autocorrelation is sufficiently accounted for.  
Table 35 is a summary of the new regression results for Model 4 with the lagged 
dependent variables included. 
Table 36. Regression Results for R&D Contract Model with Lags 
Fixed-effects (within) Regression with AR(1) Disturbance Number of obs = 66
Group variable (i): service Number of groups = 3
R-sq:                                           within = 0.7711 Obs per group: min = 22
between = 0.8059 avg = 22
overall = 0.8353 max = 22
F(12,51) 14.32
Prob > F = 0.0000
overrunpercentrd100 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
overrunpercentrd100 Lag 1 0.8776 0.1447 6.0700 0.0000
overrunpercentrd100 Lag 2 -0.2647 0.1390 -1.9000 0.0630
O&M Budget (%Change) -16.9281 6.4919 -2.6100 0.0120
Procurement Budget (% Change) -17.4210 7.1730 -2.4300 0.0190
R&D Budget (% Change) -18.0752 8.4405 -2.1400 0.0370
Industry Concentration (CR4) -0.0287 0.1377 -0.2100 0.8360
Unexpected Inflation -55.6643 54.1644 -1.0300 0.3090
Packard Commision (Lag 3) 0.0614 1.3637 0.0500 0.9640
FASA (Lag 1) -3.8548 1.7174 -2.2400 0.0290
Nunn-McCurdy Act (Lag 3) -0.9449 1.9207 -0.4900 0.6250
DAWIA 2.9565 1.7072 1.7300 0.0890
War 0.0938 1.0970 0.0900 0.9320
_cons 3.2714 6.6569 0.4900 0.6250
Baltagi-Wu LBI 2.0787
Model 4: Panel Results (R&D Cost Overruns)
 
Below is a table depicting the expected impact from past research of each 
independent variable on cost overruns and the actual impact for the R&D cost overrun 
model. 
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 Table 37. Comparison of Expected and Actual Impact on Cost Overruns 
Model 4 (R&D Cost Overruns)  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Expected Impact 
from Past Research 
Actual 
Impact 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget - - 
%ΔProcurement Budget - - 
%ΔResearch and Development Budget - - 
Industry Concentration (CR4) -  
Unexpected Inflation +  
Packard Commission  +  
FASA  - 
Nunn-McCurdy Act   
DAWIA   + 
War +  
  
 In this model, O&M and Procurement budgets are negatively correlated with cost 
overruns of R&D contracts.  This implies that all else being equal, an increase in defense 
budgets would result in a decrease in cost overruns and a decrease in defense budgets 
would result in an increase in cost overruns.  This finding is consistent with past research 
by Singleton (1991), and Drezner et al. (1996) and this is the second model of this 
research where this relationship has appeared.    
 Notice from Table 38 that as with all previous models, the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) is negatively correlated with cost overruns.  To understand the 
magnitude of this result, consider that the FASA reforms are correlated with more than a 
5% reduction in the annual cost overrun percentage.  So, for example, in 1993, the year 
before FASA was enacted, the R&D budget was just over $32 billion and cost overruns 
in that year averaged 16.8 percent.  According to this model, all else being equal, having 
the FASA reforms in 1993 would have resulted in only an 11.7 percent cost overrun for a 
savings in that year of over $1.6 billion. 
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 Table 38. Model 4 Coefficients and P-Values 
Model 4 (R&D Cost Overruns) within R2=0.3372 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Coefficient p-value 
%ΔOperations and Maintenance Budget -12.8577 0.0540 
%ΔProcurement Budget -13.2747 0.0600 
%ΔResearch and Development Budget -11.4385 0.1730 
Industry Concentration (CR4) -0.3274 0.4830 
Unexpected Inflation 45.0504 0.3170 
Packard Commission  2.1285 0.1430 
FASA -5.1298 0.0130 
Nunn-McCurdy Act -1.7796 0.4210 
DAWIA  6.1415 0.0030 
War 0.7912 0.3900 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of four panel models created to explain cost 
overruns in defense weapon system contracts. Chapter V continues the discussion of 
these findings and their implications as well as presents recommendations for further 
research.
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 V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Review of Research Objectives 
The primary purpose of this research was to create an empirical model to explain 
cost overruns in defense weapon system programs.  This was accomplished using four 
fixed-effects panel models.  Recall that prior to this study no empirical model existed to 
examine the relative impact of factors contributing to cost overruns in a dynamic setting.  
Past research had instead focused on qualitative explanations or hypothesis tests which 
are limited by a subjective treatment date and biased by omitted variables. 
To create the panel model, data was gathered from the DAES database on the cost 
overruns of 186 major weapon system programs of the Air Force, Army, and Navy from 
1970 to 2002.  The cost data was then separated into overruns by contract type and 
program phase.   Since past research identified funding instability, industry consolidation, 
estimation error, and acquisition reform as potentially impacting cost overruns, data on 
these independent variables was compiled and used to create the panel model.  In this 
research, the annual change in budgets was a proxy for funding instability while the CR4 
measured industry consolidation.  Estimation error was modeled as the amount of 
unexpected inflation in the initial estimate and acquisition reforms and war were modeled 
as dummy variables.   
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 Table 39. Independent Variables in the Panel Model 
Factor Model Variable Expected Impact
Funding Instability Percentage Change in Defense Budgets +
Industry Consolidation Industry Concentration (CR4) -
War War Dummy (Vietnam, Gulf War, Bosnia, Post-
September 11th)
+
Cost Estimating Error Unexpected Inflation in DoD +
Acquisition Reform Dummy Variables for Nunn-McCurdy, Packard, 
FASA, DAWIA
Inconclusive
 
 
The study proposed four research questions: 
1. Did the defense industry consolidation and concurrent decrease in defense 
budgets that occurred in the 1990’s affect the cost of defense weapon systems? 
2. Is war correlated with an increase in weapon system cost overruns? 
3. Is estimation error caused by unexpected inflation correlated with an increase in 
weapon system cost overruns? 
4. Did acquisition reforms have impact on cost overruns when defense industry 
consolidation, inflation, changes in the defense budget, and war are considered? 
 
Discussion of Results  
 Table 40 is a summary of the regression results from the four models and is 
referenced throughout this chapter as each research question is discussed. 
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 Table 40. Summary of Model Results 
Variable
Fixed-
Price Cost-Plus Production R&D
O&M Budget (%Change) -31.50*** 5.72* -5.00 -16.93***
Procurement Budget (% Change) -42.86*** 4.66 -6.11 -17.42***
R&D Budget (% Change) -52.45*** 9.80** -7.38 -18.08***
Industry Concentration (CR4) 0.15 41.80 0.04 -0.03
Unexpected Inflation 134.00 -0.09 4.85 -55.66
Packard Commission -6.35* -3.41*** 2.65 0.06
FASA -22.00*** -2.20** -3.37* -3.85***
Nunn-McCurdy Act -9.10** -0.99 -8.46*** -0.94
DAWIA 13.09*** 4.19*** 0.60 2.96*
War 1.29 -1.57** 1.97* 0.094  
 
Defense Industry Consolidation 
 Despite the Department of Defense expectation that the defense industry 
consolidation of the 1990’s would result in cost savings (GAO,1998:1), this research was 
unable to find any evidence of that savings.  A quick glance at Table 40 and it is clear 
that industry consolidation was not significant regardless of program phase or contract 
type.  If anything, industry concentration may have resulted in increased cost to DoD 
especially in cost-plus contracts with a coefficient of 41.8 and a p-value of .18 which is 
right outside the traditional level of statistical significance but significant in magnitude. 
 
 Defense Budgets 
 In this research, defense budgets were a proxy for funding instability.   Past 
research suggested that funding instability was negatively correlated with cost overruns.  
In other words, decreases in defense budgets were expected to result in increases in cost 
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 overruns.  This result held in the Fixed Price and Research and Development models and 
was highly statistically significant.   
To illustrate the magnitude of this finding, if the 2002 R&D budget were to drop 
by 1 percent in the fixed price model, cost overruns would be expected to increase by 
approximately (-52.45*-.01) or 0.52 percent.  At first this does not sound significant but 
consider that cost overruns in that year averaged approximately 4.2 percent on $19.4 
billion for a cost overrun in that year of about $815 million.  An increase in cost overruns 
of a half a percent to 4.7% for the year would result in an additional $96 million in 
overruns.  In other words, for every dollar of R&D budget cuts, overruns increase by 50 
cents. 
Why might funding instability result be so strongly correlated with increases in 
cost overruns?  One possible answer is that when budgets decrease, existing programs 
engage in a fight for available funding and implicitly, the lower priority programs get 
their funding cut.  But, the programs are not cancelled. Instead, they just continue on with 
inadequate funding that causes schedule delays and increased cost due to production 
breaks and orphaned technology.   In the final analysis, perhaps the funding instability is 
so highly correlated with increases in cost overruns because of poor portfolio 
management by the DoD during times of decreasing budgets. This idea that the DoD 
“corporate process” for acquisitions exacerbates cost and schedule delays is one first 
proposed by McNutt (1998) but not previously empirically quantified.  What McNutt 
meant by portfolio management is that the DoD essentially has a portfolio of weapon 
systems in development that they manage much like a car company would manage their 
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 line of products.  In the case of DoD, he suggested that the Air Force and by extension 
DoD does a poor job managing their product line essentially in times of decreasing 
budgets.   . 
 
  War 
  Past research by Czelusniak and Rogers (1997) suggested that funding instability 
from contingency operations leads to cost growth.   This study attempted to replicate that 
finding by modeling war with a dummy variable in the panel model.  Model results reveal 
that war is positively correlated with cost overruns in Cost-Plus contract types and 
negatively correlated with cost overruns in the Production phase.   
 Why might this be? At the onset of any war, service chiefs call on the acquisition 
community to provide any increase in weapon system capability that they can quickly 
push out to the battlefield.   These programs are likely to be in the R&D phase and using 
cost-plus contracts because of their increased risk. Products nearing the end of R&D are 
likely moved quickly out of R&D and into production, skipping any “gold plating” of 
requirements that would have otherwise been done.  In this scenario, it is reasonable to 
expect cost-plus contracts to decrease during war time.  Then, those same products would 
be rushed into production intuitively causing production costs to increase during a war.  
 
 Cost Estimation Error 
   Error in the cost estimate is identified as a causal factor in cost overruns by 
Christensen et al. (1999).   This research modeled cost estimation error as unexpected 
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 inflation in the cost estimate.  All cost estimates and budgets include assumptions about 
future inflation.  These inflation predictions, prepared annually by the Undersecretary of 
Defense, Comptroller are not always accurate.  For example, in the early 1980’s inflation 
was very high but DoD predictions did not anticipate this.  Consequently, inflation was 
underestimated.   
 This research included this in the models of cost overruns.  However, the results 
shown in Table 40 show that unexpected inflation is not significantly correlated with cost 
overruns.  The implication of this finding is that while cost estimating error may 
contribute to cost overruns, it is not as a result of errors in the inflation predictions.  It is 
worth noting however, that the coefficient in the fixed-price model is very high and just 
outside the range where it would traditionally be considered significant.  Perhaps if 
inflation data from the 1970’s were able to be obtained and included in future research, it 
would prove to be significant. 
 
Acquisition Reforms 
 The fourth question asked if acquisition reforms had an impact on cost overruns 
when defense industry consolidation, inflation, changes in the defense budget, and war 
were considered.  Specifically, this study surveyed past research on acquisition reform 
and identified four reforms as being most significant. Table 41 list the reforms modeled 
in this study. 
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 Table 41.  Acquisition Reforms Studied 
Acquisition Reforms Studied
Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982
Packard Commission Recommendations of 1986
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994  
 
Past research on acquisition reform has been unable to show any improvement as 
a result of reform.   This idea is summed up be Christensen et al (1999) when they said 
“Despite the implementation of more than two dozen regulatory and administrative 
initiatives, there has been no substantial improvement in the cost performance of defense 
programs for more than 30 years” (Christensen et al, 1999:252). 
 However, as discussed in earlier chapters, past research on the impact of 
acquisition reform suffered from the use of subjective treatment dates and omission of 
variables that biased their results.  Additionally, the techniques such as qualitative case 
studies and hypothesis tests limited the robustness of past results.   Indeed, once the other 
factors mentioned above were modeled, all four of the reforms studied were correlated 
with cost overruns in at least one model. 
 
 Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 
 The Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 was significantly correlated with a decrease in 
cost overruns in Fixed-Price contracts and Production contracts.   Recall that the purpose 
of the Nunn-McCurdy Act was to curtail cost overruns in defense weapon systems.  Yet, 
over 20 years after its enactment, there had been little research studying its impact.   To 
understand the magnitude of this finding, consider that model results suggest that all else 
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 being equal, the added presence of the Nunn-McCurdy act lowered contract cost overruns 
by 9.1 percent in Fixed Price contracts and by 8.5 percent in Production contracts.   
 
 The Packard Commission (1986) 
  One of the most researched acquisition reforms was the Packard Commission 
recommendations of 1986.   This purpose of this reform was to improve the defense 
acquisition process by streamlining the chain of command, improving tests and 
prototyping and planning, and modeling the DoD after a competitive firm (Searle, 
1997:33). 
 The idea was that these changes would result in weapon systems that could be 
produced more quickly and at a lower cost.  Yet, past research by Searle (1997) and 
Christensen et al. (1999) suggested that the Packard Commission recommendations had 
no impact on cost overruns and that the overruns actually got worse after the Packard 
Commission reforms were implemented.   
 This research contradicts these findings somewhat.  In two of the four models, fixed 
price and cost-plus cost overruns, the Packard Commission recommendations are 
negatively correlated with contracted cost overruns.  In other words, the presence of the 
Packard Commission reforms was correlated with a decrease in contract cost overruns.  
Especially significant is the result in the Cost-Plus contract model which illustrated that 
all else being equal, the presence of the Packard Commission reforms resulted in a 3.4 
percent decrease in cost overruns.  This result is significant to the α =.01 level. 
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  DAWIA (1990) 
 In 1990, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act was enacted to 
improve the level of education of the acquisition workforce.  Intuitively, one would 
expect that a more well trained and educated workforce would be able to deliver weapon 
systems at a decreased cost.  However, results of this analysis show that DAWIA is 
positively correlated with cost overruns.  The cause of this result is unknown.  Perhaps 
the finding suggests that the time away from work that is instead spent on training is 
causing cost performance to suffer.  Or, perhaps this correlation is just contemporaneous 
meaning that it is statistically significant but not as a result of any causal link. 
 
  FASA (1994) 
In 1994, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act was created to empower the 
acquisition workforce to make decisions about how to manage their programs.  This was 
a movement away from the restrictive and centralized procurement practices of the past.  
(Cooper, 2002:15).    Other key provision of FASA were the increased use of 
performance based contract payments, and the push towards more “commercial or off the 
shelf products” (Cooper, 2002:18).  Most important for this study were the requirements 
that contractors have a certified cost accounting system that complies with accepted cost 
accounting standards and also the increased scrutiny of a contractor’s past performance in 
the source selection criterion of major weapon system purchases.   Clearly these 
provisions should have led to decreases in weapon system cost and should be 
investigated.  Indeed, in their 1999 paper, Christensen et al. suggest that the impact of the 
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 FASA reform is worthy of study but that some time would have to pass before its impact 
could be felt (Christensen et al, 1999: 258).   
Now, twelve years after the reform, the impact was investigated by this research 
and indeed FASA did reduced cost overruns.  This result held in all models regardless of 
contract type or program phase and all else being equal, the presence of FASA reduced 
cost overruns by as little as 2% in Cost-Plus contracts to as much as 21% in Fixed-Price 
contracts. 
Conclusions 
 The purpose of this research was to create an empirical model that described cost 
overruns in defense weapon systems.  This was accomplished by modeling cost overruns 
of 186 major weapons system programs of the Air Force, Army, and Navy over a period 
of 32 years. 
 Major findings of this research are as follows: 
• The Defense Industry Consolidation of the 1990’s did not result in significant cost 
savings for the Department of Defense and might even have resulted in increases 
in cost overruns. 
 
• Funding Instability is highly correlated with an increase in cost overruns in Fixed-
Price contracts and contracts in the Research and Development Phase.  This could 
be a result of poor portfolio management by the DoD in times of decreasing 
budgets.  Funding instability contributed to an increase in contract cost overruns 
of $13.4 billion since 1970. 
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• War is correlated with decreases in Cost-Plus contract cost overruns and increases 
in Production cost overruns.  This could illustrate the impact of nearly completed 
weapons modifications being pushed into production early at the onset of war. 
 
• Estimation error caused by unexpected inflation is not significantly correlated 
with cost overruns.  If estimation error in cost estimates is a causal factor in 
contract cost overruns, it is likely the result of some other aspect of weapon 
system cost estimating. 
 
• With the exception of DAWIA, acquisition reforms are correlated with a decrease 
in cost overruns of defense weapon systems. In particular, reforms resulting from 
the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982, the Packard Commission Recommendations of 
1986 and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 resulted in 
savings of almost $124 billion since 1982.  Yet, the biggest implication of this 
finding is not the correlation of one specific reform with contract cost overruns 
but the consistency with which the acquisition reforms did matter and did act to 
reduce cost overruns in defense weapon systems.  
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 Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research has created an empirical model that has laid the foundation for 
further study of the causes of cost overruns in defense weapon systems.   Without a 
doubt, there are other factors related to weapon system costs that were not modeled in 
this study.  For example, in his confirmation hearing, Air Force Chief of Staff, General 
Michael Mosely said that acquisition corps manning decreases may have contributed to 
weapon system cost growth.  That data could easily be added to the model created in this 
thesis.  Also, other importance events such as the formation of the Air Force Materiel 
Command in the early 1990’s could be modeled.  Finally, the research linking cost 
overruns and schedule delay is inconclusive.  A model that incorporated schedule as an 
independent variable explaining cost overruns or a model that treated schedule as the 
dependent variable and cost overruns as an independent variable would also advance the 
current level of research. 
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 Appendix A. Summary of DAES Data 
 
 
Air Force
Program Name Number of Contract Entries
A-10 38
ACM 82
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF) 10
AFATDS 2
Airborne Laser (ABL) 23
ALCM 91
AMRAAM (AIM-120A) 175
ASAT 83
ATS 29
B-1 CMUP-DSUP 2
B-1B 432
B-1B CMUP 62
B-2A 15
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program ((C-130 AMP) 2
C-17A 291
CMU 115
CSRL 23
DMSP 176
DSCS III A&B 65
DSP 294
E-3 AWACS RSIP 73
E-3A Hawkeye 125
E-4 (AABNCP) 34
EF-111A 35
EJS 13
F/A-22 raptor 91
F-15 221
F-16 270
GBS 17
GLCM 58
Global Hawk Unmanned aerial Vehicle 2
Inertial Upper Stage 29
IR Maverick 58
I-S/A AMPE 13
JDAM 30
JGL Tacit Rainbow 27
Joint air to surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) 16
Joint Primary training aircraft (JPATS) (T-45) 88
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 36
JSIPS CIGSS 22
JSTARS 181
KC-135R 53
MARK XV IFF 33
MAVERICK (LASER) 12
MILSTAR 49
Minuteman III Guidance replacement Program (MMIII GRP) 90
Minuteman III Propulsion replacement program (MMII PRP) 53
MP RTIP 4
National Polar Orbiting operational; environmental 28
Navistar Global Positioning system (GPS) II Modern 306
OTH-B (Radar) 52
Peacekeeper 868
PLSS 25
Rail Garrison 48
Sensor Fused Weapon 83
Small ICBM 234
SMART-T 20
Space based infra red surveillance system (SBIRS) 37
SRAM T AGM 131A/B 17
T-46A 34
Titan IV 91  
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 Army 
Program Name Number of Contract Entries
ABRAMS Tank M1/M1A1 78
ADDS 68
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures / Common Missile Wa 25
AFATDS (ATCCS) 49
AH-64 Apache 195
AHIP Kiowa Warrior 14
AN/TTC-39 28
Army TACMS 65
ASAS (ATCCS) Block IIB III 49
ATACMS BLK II 104
BFVS A3 Upgrade 29
BFVS M2 M3 (Bradley Fighting Vehicle 129
CH-47 Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F) 13
CH-47D Chinook 46
CHEYENNE 18
Comanche Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter (RAH-66) 102
COPPERHEAD 39
CRUSADER 27
CSSCS 21
FAAD C2I 64
FAAD NLOS Fiber Optic Guided-Missile 7
FBCB2 19
GMLRS Upgrade Missile 13
IAV (Stryker) 6
Javelin 71
JSTARS Common Ground Station (CGS) 26
LANCE 13
Laser Hellfire 119
Longbow Apache FCR 73
Longbow Hellfire 21
M1A2 Abrams Upgrade 10
MCS IV 25
MLRS 82
MLRS-TGW 57
PATRIOT 270
Patriot PAC-3 142
PERSHING II 97
ROLAND 32
RPV (AQUILA) 68
SADARM 87
SCAMP 10
SGT YORK GUN (DIVAD) 31
SINCGARS 38
SOTAS 17
STINGER 126
STINGER RMP 56
TACFIRE 7
TACIT RAINBOW (JGL) 3
TOW 2 19
UH-60A/L Black Hawk 135  
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 Navy 
Program Name Number of Contract Entries
5-Inch GUIDED PROJECTILE 13
A-12 9
AAAM 16
advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) 20
Aim-9X  Short range air to air missile 35
AN/BSY-1 76
AN/BSY-2 26
AN/SQQ-89 206
AN-APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar 2
AOE 6 73
ASPJ (AN/ALQ-165) 45
AV-8B Harrier II 28
C/MH-53E 55
CAPTOR (MK 60 MINE) 84
CG 47 Aegis Cruiser 243
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 53
CVN 68 66
DD 963 7
DD(X) Destroyer 3
DDG 51 499
E-2C Computer Upgrade 63
EMSP 12
F/A-18 C/D 112
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet 129
F-14D 35
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 6
FDS 60
FFG-7 271
Future Aircraft Carrier CVN 21 2
HARM (NAVY) 51
Harpoon A/R/UGM-84 24
Joint standoff weapon (JSOW) 61
JTIDS (NAVY) 23
LAMPS MKIII 74
LCAC 155
LHD-1 151
LPD-17 45
LSD 41 CARGO VAR 26
LSD 41 Class CV 24
MCM 1 37
MH-60R 76
MH-60S 9
MHC 51 112
MIDS-LVT 43
MK 48 ADCAP 46
MK 50 Torpedo 84
NATO PHM 20
Navy Area TMBD 70
NSSN New Attack Sub 167
P-7A 6
PHALANX CIWS (MK-15) 40
Phoenix (AIM-54C) 16
ROTHR 3
SEA LANCE 33
SEALIFT 123
SIDEWINDER (AIM-9L) (Navy) 24
SIDEWINDER (AIM-9M) (Navy) 1
SLAT (AQM-127A) 12
SM 2 (BLKS I-IV) 98
SPARROW (AIM-7M) (Navy) 28
SSDS 20
SSN 688 Attack Sub 261
SURTASS 9
T-45TS 21
TACTAS 2
Tactical Tomahawk Missile 14
T-AGOS 20
T-AO 187 OILER 26
Tomahawk R/UGM-109 338
TRIDENT II MSL 392
TRIDENT II SUB 157
TRIDENT SUB 72
USMC H-1 Upgrades 17
V-22 Joint services advanced vertical lift aircraft 210
Virginia Class Sub SSN 774 84  
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 Appendix B.  Earned Value Management Gold Card 
 
 
 Earned Value Management
 ‘Gold Card’
Defense Acquisition University
VARIANCES Favorable is Positive, Unfavorable is Negative
Cost Variance CV =  BCWP – CV % = (CV / BCWP) *100 
Schedule Variance SV =  BCWP – BCWS SV % = (SV / BCWS) * 100
Variance at Completion VAC =  BAC    – EAC
PERFORMANCE INDICES
ACWP
Favorable is > 1.0, Unfavorable is < 1.0
Cost Efficiency CPI  = BCWP / 
Schedule Efficiency SPI  = BCWP / BCWS
OVERALL STATUS
ACWP
% Schedule =  (BCWSCUM / BAC) * 100
% Complete =  (BCWPCUM /  BAC) * 100
% Spent =  ( /  BAC) * 100
ESTIMATE AT COMPLETION
ACWPCUM
#
EAC =   [(Remaining Work) / (Efficiency Factor)]
EACCPI =        +  [(BAC – BCWPCUM) / CPICUM ] = BAC / CPICUM
EACComposite =        +  [(BAC – BCWPCUM) / (CPICUM * SPICUM)]
TO COMPLETE PERFORMANCE INDEX (TCPI)
Actuals to Date + 
ACWPCUM
ACWPCUM
#
TCPIEAC =  Work Remaining / Cost Remaining = (BAC – BCWPCUM) / (EAC –
# To Determine Either TCPI or EAC; You May Replace BAC with TAB
ACWPCUM)
Management Reserve
BCWP
BCWS
Cost 
Variance
ACWP
Schedule Variance
$
EAC
Time
Now
Completion 
Date
PMB
TAB
BAC
time
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EVM Home Page = https://acc.dau.mil/evm
DAU POC: (703) 805-5259 (DSN 655)
eMail Address: EVM@dau.mil
Revised February 2006
TERMINOLOGY
NCC Negotiated Contract Cost Contract price less profit / fee(s)
AUW Authorized Unpriced Work Work contractually approved, but not yet negotiated / definitized
CBB Contract Budget Base Sum of NCC and AUW
OTB Over Target Baseline Sum of CBB and recognized overrun
TAB Total Allocated Budget Sum of all budgets for work on contract = NCC, CBB, or OTB
BAC Budget At Completion Total budget for total contract thru any given level
PMB Performance Measurement Baseline Contract time-phased budget plan
MR Management Reserve Budget withheld by Ktr PM for unknowns / risk management
UB Undistributed Budget Broadly defined activities not yet distributed to CAs 
CA Control Account Lowest CWBS element assigned to a single focal point to plan & control
scope / schedule / budget
WP Work Package Near-term, detail-planned activities within a CA
PP Planning Package Far-term CA activities not yet defined into WPs
BCWS Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled Value of work planned to be accomplished = PLANNED VALUE
BCWP Budgeted Cost for Work Performed Value of work accomplished = EARNED VALUE
ACWP Actual Cost of Work Performed Cost of work accomplished = ACTUAL COST
EAC Estimate At Completion Estimate of total cost for total contract thru any given level;
may be generated by Ktr, PMO, DCMA, etc. = EACKtr / PMO / DCMA
LRE Latest Revised Estimate Ktr’s EAC or EACKtr
SLPP Summary Level Planning Package Far-term activities not yet defined into CAs
TCPI To Complete Performance Index Efficiency needed from ‘time now’ to achieve an EAC
EVM POLICY: DoDI 5000.2, Table E3.T2 . EVMS in accordance with ANSI/EIA-748 is required for cost or 
incentive contracts, subcontracts, intra-government work agreements, & other agreements valued > $20M (The Yr $).
 $50M (TY $)
 $20M
n-  
EVMS contracts >  require that the EVM system be formally validated by the cognizant contracting officer. 
Additional Guidance in Defense Acquisition Guidebook and the Earned Value Management Implementation Guide 
(EVMIG). EVMS is discouraged on Firm-Fixed Price, Level of Effort, & Time & Material efforts regardless of dollar 
value. 
EVM CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS:
DFAR Clauses - 252.242-7001 for solicitations and 252.242-7002 for solicitations and contracts
Contract Performance Report – DI-MGMT-81466A * 5 Formats (WBS, Organization, Baseline, Staffing & Explanation)
Integrated Master Schedule    – DI-MGMT-81650 * 
Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) - Mandatory for all EVMS contracts >
* See the EVMIG for CPR and IMS tailoring guidance.
Management 
Reserve
Work Packages Planning Packages 
OVERRUN  
AUW  
Control 
Accounts 
NCC  
Undistributed
Budget
OTB  
CBB          
TAB Profit / Fees  
PMB  
Summary Level 
lanning Packages  
Contract Price
P
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 Appendix C: Budget Summary 
 
 
All budget figures represent Total Obligation Authority as reported in various 
tables from Chapter 6 of the DoD Greenbook which is published annually in support of 
the Presidents Budget submission.  Budget data is in millions of fiscal year 2006 dollars.  
Air Force
Total Budget Procurement Budget R&D Budget
1970 $129,730 $33,797 $13,748
1971 $118,941 $29,995 $12,057
1972 $113,724 $27,466 $11,955
1973 $108,816 $25,968 $12,029
1974 $99,936 $22,018 $10,803
1975 $94,940 $20,823 $10,459
1976 $96,459 $23,905 $10,637
1977 $97,424 $26,797 $10,371
1978 $95,686 $27,338 $10,636
1979 $93,302 $25,974 $10,058
1980 $96,997 $27,696 $10,452
1981 $108,721 $32,815 $13,584
1982 $123,096 $42,368 $15,960
1983 $133,487 $46,369 $18,301
1984 $149,387 $57,168 $20,303
1985 $164,097 $61,309 $21,103
1986 $156,943 $55,108 $20,574
1987 $152,567 $49,538 $22,606
1988 $143,145 $39,810 $21,898
1989 $144,126 $42,158 $20,368
1990 $138,110 $39,922 $18,268
1991 $127,982 $31,457 $15,460
1992 $115,768 $29,448 $16,529
1993 $107,506 $26,339 $15,860
1994 $99,669 $21,028 $14,849
1995 $97,027 $18,674 $13,885
1996 $95,324 $19,279 $14,688
1997 $91,830 $16,481 $16,271
1998 $93,314 $17,402 $16,328
1999 $96,398 $20,438 $15,493
2000 $97,171 $20,928 $16,117
2001 $101,578 $24,147 $15,630
2002 $110,319 $25,446 $15,642  
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 Army
Total Budget Procurement Budget R&D Budget
1970 $132,886 $19,015 $7,524
1971 $117,812 $13,735 $7,285
1972 $106,780 $13,518 $7,476
1973 $95,341 $10,131 $7,427
1974 $87,998 $8,296 $6,921
1975 $82,551 $7,550 $5,894
1976 $84,450 $8,524 $5,971
1977 $87,321 $11,183 $6,323
1978 $87,721 $12,966 $6,285
1979 $89,084 $13,882 $6,124
1980 $89,570 $13,514 $6,020
1981 $99,022 $19,688 $6,104
1982 $108,720 $24,373 $6,720
1983 $113,588 $26,269 $6,972
1984 $117,055 $27,056 $7,244
1985 $132,560 $28,305 $7,213
1986 $130,756 $25,907 $7,584
1987 $129,806 $22,600 $7,583
1988 $126,861 $21,116 $7,234
1989 $125,362 $19,795 $7,571
1990 $122,939 $18,142 $7,560
1991 $135,699 $14,100 $7,640
1992 $110,042 $10,772 $8,476
1993 $95,176 $9,012 $7,824
1994 $88,265 $8,291 $6,939
1995 $87,214 $7,895 $6,804
1996 $86,866 $8,827 $5,915
1997 $84,023 $9,297 $6,006
1998 $80,839 $8,366 $5,984
1999 $84,673 $10,690 $5,893
2000 $86,636 $11,609 $6,054
2001 $89,864 $13,003 $6,987
2002 $95,810 $12,532 $7,673  
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 Navy
Total Budget Procurement Budget R&D Budget
1970 $119,405 $32,208 $10,596
1971 $108,200 $29,644 $9,796
1972 $109,139 $33,418 $10,169
1973 $106,588 $31,868 $10,023
1974 $105,046 $29,749 $9,762
1975 $99,978 $25,779 $9,857
1976 $103,677 $28,486 $9,956
1977 $109,586 $33,271 $10,404
1978 $111,114 $34,533 $10,365
1979 $109,235 $32,202 $9,949
1980 $110,160 $31,807 $9,248
1981 $119,993 $37,168 $9,358
1982 $132,101 $44,672 $10,264
1983 $146,238 $54,471 $10,345
1984 $144,987 $48,852 $12,480
1985 $162,118 $49,280 $14,313
1986 $158,825 $47,959 $14,652
1987 $157,168 $47,596 $13,908
1988 $162,419 $52,196 $13,691
1989 $151,264 $43,183 $12,872
1990 $147,769 $43,732 $11,635
1991 $145,155 $38,970 $10,275
1992 $127,247 $31,278 $10,769
1993 $117,676 $25,641 $11,267
1994 $104,782 $19,079 $10,033
1995 $103,239 $20,402 $10,327
1996 $102,170 $18,342 $9,991
1997 $99,815 $19,865 $9,164
1998 $100,323 $22,324 $9,073
1999 $101,767 $23,288 $10,248
2000 $103,789 $26,149 $10,174
2001 $109,238 $29,204 $10,578
2002 $112,525 $26,525 $12,352  
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 Appendix D. Model Lag Structure Results 
 
Budget Variables AIC
Lag Fixed-Price Cost-Plus Production R&D
0 412.83 286.941 344.1723 349.9155
1 425.61 285.1438 342.4186 353.5846
2 421.95 278.5705 343.8825 350.0317
3 423.40 286.9981 339.0549 352.0559
4 424.20 286.1704 343.6701 352.14
5 425.40 285.064 339.9242 353.6565
6 425.40 287.0761 342.2523 353.0675
7 426.13 288.4477 343.2183 353.5141  
 
Nunn-McCurdy AIC
Lag Fixed-Price Cost-Plus Production R&D
0 412.83 286.94 344.17 349.92
1 417.26 289.80 356.09 349.83
2 417.27 288.15 357.38 349.89
3 415.30 291.14 355.70 347.92
4 417.30 290.33 357.74 349.15
5 416.98 290.11 357.65 349.39
6 415.54 289.30 357.45 348.78
7 415.30 291.82 355.70 347.92  
 
Packard AIC
Lag Fixed-Price Cost-Plus Production R&D
0 412.83 286.94 344.17 349.92
1 415.51 286.67 343.30 348.97
2 414.08 287.11 344.73 343.31
3 415.14 286.55 344.96 348.75
4 414.64 287.33 340.24 350.53
5 415.00 284.64 344.47 350.02
6 414.46 281.96 344.96 350.79
7 414.25 276.36 345.13 350.45  
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 DAWIA AIC
Lag Fixed-Price Cost-Plus Production R&D
0 412.83 286.94 344.17 349.92
1 417.74 289.80 345.85 360.26
2 410.75 288.15 348.71 360.37
3 422.10 291.14 348.29 359.79
4 423.43 290.33 346.49 358.36
5 424.55 290.11 345.33 355.73
6 424.25 289.30 347.55 353.58
7 424.90 291.82 348.34 359.85  
 
FASA AIC
Lag Fixed-Price Cost-Plus Production R&D
0 412.83 286.94 344.17 286.94
1 427.78 283.05 340.05 283.05
2 423.41 282.84 345.22 282.84
3 428.84 286.82 347.81 286.82
4 426.76 287.50 341.61 287.50
5 429.39 287.25 347.49 287.25
6 429.30 287.73 347.81 287.73
7 429.02 285.41 347.02 285.41  
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 Appendix E. Test for Stationarity of the Dependent Variable 
 
 The dependent variable in panel regression must be stationary to prevent spurious 
regression.  This is tested by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for a unit root.  Since the 
p-value for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is less than α =.10 for each model, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the variable is non-stationary and conclude that the data 
comes from a stationary process. 
Fixed Price Contracts (Overrunpercentfp100) 
Dickey-Fuller test for Unit Root    
        
    Z(t) has t-distribution 
   Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
  Number of Obs Statistic Value Value Value 
Z(t)-Air Force 28 -2.0300 -2.4790 -1.7060 -1.3150 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0263     
        
Z(t)-Army 27 -2.8650 -2.4850 -1.7080 -1.3160 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0000     
        
Z(t)-Navy 26 -4.3710 -2.4920 -1.7110 -1.3180 
p-value for Z(t) =   0.0001       
 
 
Cost-Plus Contracts (Overrunpercentcp100) 
Dickey-Fuller test for Unit Root    
        
    Z(t) has t-distribution 
   Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
  Number of Obs Statistic Value Value Value 
Z(t)-Air Force 32 -2.7250 -2.4570 -1.6970 -1.3100 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0053     
        
Z(t)-Army 30 -3.9080  -1.7010 -1.3130 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0003     
        
Z(t)-Navy 27 -2.5370 -2.4850 -1.7080 -1.3160 
p-value for Z(t) =   0.0089       
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 Production Contracts (Overrunpercentproc100) 
Dickey-Fuller test for Unit Root    
        
    Z(t) has t-distribution 
   Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
  Number of Obs Statistic Value Value Value 
Z(t)-Air Force 27 -1.6630 -2.4850 -1.7080 -1.3160 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0544     
        
Z(t)-Army 23 -2.7130 -2.5180 -1.7210 -1.3230 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0065     
        
Z(t)-Navy 24 -2.9650 -2.5080 -1.7170 -1.3210 
p-value for Z(t) =   0.0036       
 
 
Research and Development Contracts (Overrunpercentrd100) 
Dickey-Fuller test for Unit Root    
        
    Z(t) has t-distribution 
   Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
  Number of Obs Statistic Value Value Value 
Z(t)-Air Force 32 -1.3640 -2.4570 -1.6970 -1.3100 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0914     
        
Z(t)-Army 30 -4.1010 -2.4670 -1.7010 -1.3130 
p-value for Z(t) =  0.0002     
        
Z(t)-Navy 27 -1.4530 -2.4850 -1.7080 -1.3160 
p-value for Z(t) =   0.0793       
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